Why did Canada, Australia and New Zealand separate from the UK?

Why did Canada, Australia and New Zealand separate from the UK?


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I asked this question in various places on the Web. I haven't received a clear answer.

The USA separated from the UK because the people felt that they were not British, and they weren't.

Weren't Canadians/Australians/New Zealanders also descended from the British?

Or was it that UK was unable to administer them for financial reasons? I will not accept this as an answer. In this case why was the UK able to hold on to to Scotland, England, Northern Ireland and Wales?

Why are Canada/Australia/New Zealand not administered from the UK?


In Common Sense, Thomas Paine wrote, "there is something very absurd in supposing a continent to be perpetually governed by an island."

The United States, Canada, and Australia (New Zealand to a lesser extent), were all countries of continental size, far away from England. As such, they naturally wanted to have their own destinies.

Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, were all smaller than (and nearby) England, and therefore "absorbable" by England into the United Kingdom.

Although if one looks at the troubles in Northern Ireland, or the Scottish independence movement, one even wonders about their "absorbability."


Simple answer - it's complicated!

The world was very different in 1776 than it was in 1867 or 1900. The US war of independance followed the movement/ideas that led to the French revolution and was a real political/philosophical difference in how you should run a country. It was also concentrated in a few large cities with a large established political class. At the same time Canada, NZ and Australia were much more sparsely populated by people who were mostly much newer immigrants and still thought of themselves as British so there was no real 'independence' movement.

The formation of these three into separate countries was a much more gentle gradual process and generally fairly peaceful. I think there was a genuine feeling that their economies, population etc was big enough to stand on their own and there was no legitimate reason to stop them - better as friendly 'cousins' than prisoners.

India, the remaining bits of Africa and the Caribbean following WWII was more a combination of, "we can't afford them", "we just fought a war for freedom we can't really justify our own Reich" and the Bomb+Cold war makes the empire pretty irrelevant anyway.

Why Scotland, England, Northern Ireland and Wales didn't get separated then?

At the time? Because either their economies and population didn't support it or were much much more interlinked with England's. Ireland is a bit of a special case - there were political/religious reasons for it being independent which overrode other concerns


Australia achieved independence from the United Kingdom in 1986 ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Australia_Act_1986 ). This occurred for a number of reasons: The UK's entry into the EEC and the exclusion of Australian exports from the UK market; Lingering resentment over the nature of the Dismissal; and, the fact that Australia had been a functionally self-governing advanced industrial nation since 1901, and that this was the final conclusion.

Australia federated in 1901 to eliminate internal customs barriers, and to ease local responsibility for imperial self defence. This heightened the attempt to produce an Australian manufacturing economy, and new found Federal powers were used to supplement existing initiatives in this area.

Australia developed a manufacturing economy because of the distances involved in transport, and the poor supply of goods from the UK. As soon as this began, Australia developed semi-independent capital. From this point onwards the idea of the United Kingdom maintaining permanent administration over the Australian colonies was a fairytale. I'd suggest looking into the development of Australian Liberalism in the 19th Century, and its defeat of the squatocratic conception of a "status society" in Australia. With Australian Liberalism came the Australian Bourgeoisie (a local version of the UK outfit), and with such localisation came the idea of a manufacturing economy.

I'd suggest Raewyn Connell, Terence H. Irving (1980) Class structure in Australian history for this, it goes into a number of decisive points in the replication of Australian class society and its economy.


Scotland, Ireland and Wales along with England were all integral parts of the UK with full representation in the UK government. The four nations each benefited from the Union, for the most part anyway. And so with the exception of Ireland, there has never been a majority in any of the four in favour of independence. (that may change soon though.)

Canada, Australia, New Zealand and others were possessions of the UK. They didn't not have representation in the UK government. Instead they had their own system of government headed by a Governed General who represented the Queen. They were, to a great extent, independent from the UK on many matters already prior to official independence. These territories had developed to a level where they could look after their own without the British to assist and so more extensive independence was beneficial to them and freed the British of the costs of maintaining garrisons in far flung corners of the globe. Particularly after WWII when the British were rather strapped for cash.

In addition, post WWII there, the anti-colonial movements were gaining ground and a lot of political pressure was placed on the British government to make states independent of the empire (wither they wanted it or not). This anti-colonialism applied to Ireland too as it was seen as a colony, but did not apply to Wales and Scotland, and certainly not the England, as they were, as I said before, integral parts of the UK and closely bonded together with a single government.

Canada, Australia and New Zealand are however still lightly connected to the UK through the British Commonwealth. All the Commonwealth nations share the same Queen as head of state and they each still have a Governor General who represents the Queen in those countries.

Conversely, Ireland left the Commonwealth shortly after gaining independence and so is today completely independent.


Actually the perception of these places being independent is much greater then the actual degree of separation. In Canada for instance they had to ask the queen for permission to dissolve the parliament.

Fun fact: Canadians pay more per capita in taxes to the queen then the British do. Approximately 1.54 per capita vs the 1.32 that the English pay.

Added Source as requested for above comment: Maclean's


There are a few reasons that the Australasian colonies decided to federate - and the emphasis will differ depending on which (historical) person you ask. If I may use a modern comparison, there a few reasons that Australia did not become a republic when the referendum was put to the people in 1999: there were various groups and people advocating the “Yes” or “No” positions, and each group/person did so for different reasons. Saying that it was simply that Australians didn't want to become a republic is simplistic.

Similarly, we can not point to any single reason and say “That is why the colonies decided to federate!” There were many reasons and motives proposed by many people and organisations over a few decades, and they all contributed to the final outcome.

As early as 1857, a Select Committee in the recently formed colony of Victoria wrote:

Your Committe are unanimous in believing that the interest and honor of these growing States would be promoted by the establishment of a system of mutual action and co-operation among them. Their interest suffers, and must continue to suffer, while competing tariffs, naturalization laws, and land systems, rival schemes of immigration, and of ocean postage [… ] exist; and the honor and importance which constitute so essential an element of national prosperity, and the absence of which invites aggression from foreign enemies, cannot in this generation belong to any single Colony of the Southern Group; but may, we are persuaded would, be speedily attained by an Australian Federation representing the entire.

[… ] By becoming confederates so early in their career, the Australian Colonies would, we believe, immensely economize their strength and resources. [… ] They would not only save time and money, but attain increased vigor and accuracy, by treating the larger questions of public policy at one time and place.

[Report from the Select Committee upon the Federal Union of the Australian Colonies, 1856-7]

Note the various reasons listed for federating: tariffs, citizenships, immigration, postage, defense, efficiency.

In 1870, Charles Gavan Duffy spoke in the Victorian Parliament about this previous Select Committee report. His main point was that there had been no action on this report for too long. In pushing for action, he said:

It may be said, no doubt, that England is mistress of the seas, and will be able to protect her commerce and ours. But France and America have been making enormous expenditure and immense exertions for years past to be in a position to compete for this supremacy. Even if it be admitted that England would be able to protect the great highway to Europe by the Cape, will she be able to guard the Northern Pacific, or to save the great Australian cities from fleets stationed at San Francisco or New Caledonia?

[… ] it would put an end to what a Canadian statesman describes as “colonies cutting each others throats with razors called tariffs”. It would create between us an intercourse of mind. [… ] It would result in the creation of a national spirit [… ] And, finally, it would give Australia complete control of her own resources for the protection of her own interests.

Alfred Deakin, an eyewitness to, and key participant in, the process of federation, wrote in his 'The Federal Story' (based on notes he kept during the years that federation was discussed and progressed):

The Federal impulse of 1880 was in the first place a reaction from the ultra-Protectionist policy [of the Victorian colony] of 1878-9 some of whose imposts, and the Stock Tax in particular, being directly aimed at intercolonial imports, naturally provoked great bitterness on the border.

In this, he wasn't far wrong. After the idea of federating had floated in the ether for years and decades, and an abortive start toward Fedaration was made in 1890, matters finally came to a head in 1893 when people around the Victoria-New South Wales border gathered in a meeting which later became known as “the Corowa Conference” to push for action on federation because they were sick and tired of paying customs every time they moved goods across the river.

Back to Deakin's 'Federal Story':

Dread of German aggression in New Guinea and of a French annexation of the New Hebrides [was among] the chief operating causes of [the Intercolonial Convention of 1883].

Deakin himself said:

… that they [the Australasian Colonies] were asked [by the British government] to surrender the New Hebrides as of little commercial value and in the next breath were told that the French set the greatest store by them for commercial development. [The French's] interest in Australasia were spoken of as large, while ours which were incomparably larger were brushed aside as of no account. [… ] We were assured that our alarm as to French intentions was groundless but we should never forget that it was while relying on a similar assurance from the Colonial Office, our trust had been betrayed by a surrender of part of New Guinea to Germany.

So, intercolonial taxes and mutual defence were two of the main issues.

Henry Parkes, the so-called “Father of Federation” repeatedly stressed the issue of mutual defence, starting with his Tenterfield Oration:

The Imperial General who inspected the troops of the colony had recommended that the whole of the forces of Australia should be united into one army. It would be pleasing if they could rely on being safe without taking military precautions at all; but as this was impossible, they must take measure to defend themselves

The Australian Natives' Association, a mutual society exclusively for Australian-born natives (of British descent, of course!), was strongly in favour of Federation. They were behind the previously mentioned the Corowa Conference. They also believed:

[… ] the future well-being of Australia, its progress and prosperity, and the material wealth of the colonists themselves, depend on its being united.

[… ] the Board of Directors [of the ANA] must organise a crusade throughout the length and breadth of the continent [… ] The great body of native-born electors in the Riverina should be aroused to a sense of the possibilities that may follow their co-operating with brother Australians. [… ] inasmuch as the Board considers the people of Australia, from the Gulf of Carpentaria to the Australian Bight, and from Perth to Port Jackson, want to be appealed to, they recommend the [ANA] Conference to instruct the incoming Board to open a vigorous campaign. The time is ripe for an appeal to the whole of Australia.

[Report of the ANA Conference at Warrnambool, Victoria in 1894]

But, regardless of the ANA's call to co-operation and brotherhood, the main two reasons the Australian colonies federated were to remove intercolonial taxes and mutual defence.


For Canada, many reasons brought it to independence.

First of all, colonies were taken and land was captured so metropolis could exploit natural resources there. Canada was thought to have gold (and a way to go straight to China, the Northwest passage).

Finally, none of these were proven, and the most wanted resources were

1-fish

2-beaver fur

3- wood (especially during Napoleon's blocus)

At the end of 19th century, these resources weren't as attractive as they used to be.

Also it was quite costly to maintain troops there to prevent a US attack (like the one that occurred in 1813). Great Britain clearly had other more valuable interests elsewhere around the globe, so they gave Canada permission to create a confederation in 1867. The country wasn't completely independent though, as it was still part of Commonwealth. We can see effect of that during WWI when UK declared war for Canada. But it was only after the war, where Canada had proven its value, and the UK lost prestige and wasn't the 1st nation of the World that Canada was really given autonomy with Westminster Status in 1931.

Even with the Constitution being brought back to Canada in 1982, Canada is still part of Commonwealth and the real leader of the country is still the Queen. Every bill voted has to be signed by her representative, the governor. You can note this role is only symbolic.


We should note that many of the people in these places are NOT of British ancestry. The French Canadians of Quebec come to mind - they certainly were not eager to be British subjects, but were more willing to support an independent Canada. Australia also has a large population of Irish ancestry who, again, probably were not thrilled to be ruled by Britain.


Independence from the UK was less important to the creation of Canada and Australia than federation of independent colonies were.

Immediately prior to federation in 1901, Australia was effectively six independent nations. All part of the British Empire, true, but largely run from their colonial capital cities. Federating the colonies into the nation of Australia was much more about getting the colonies to work together than it was separating from the UK. Before federation, there were massive import duties on goods crossing colony boundaries, and all sorts of other impediments to interaction. The forming of Australia was not entirely unlike the forming of the EU.

After federation, the UK still controlled Australian foreign policy for some decades, there was no such thing as an Australian citizen until 1936, and the UK's highest court could still be appealed to from Australia's highest court until 1986. There's been a gradual migration of powers moving from the UK to Australia since the UK first settled the place.

I am less familiar with Canadian history, but I understand things were similar there. Newfoundland was a special case where the locals preferred ties to the UK to Canada until 1949. And even then, the referendum to join Canada only just passed.

In the case of US independence, that wasn't a case of everyone in all the British American colonies suddenly deciding to separate because they no longer felt British. It started with a tiny number of people who didn't like what their government was doing. They decided to fight their local government authorities, picking up more support over time. After taking over the middle 13 British colonies, they decided to stop. They spend up the transition of power about 100 years, and in doing so stopped the resulting federation from including what's now Canada and half the Caribbean.


Why did Canada, Australia and New Zealand separate from the UK? - History

A common assumption in the June 23 referendum debate is that after leaving the EU, the UK could “simply” operate as an ordinary WTO member. Eventually that’s true, but getting there would be far from simple.

Some experts believe that the adjustments would be little more than technical, and that any negotiations would be straightforward. They could be right. It would depend on whether the WTO’s membership is determined to accommodate the UK’s wishes.

But recent experience in the WTO suggests that is unlikely. A closer look at the details suggests some key issues could be politically contentious among the WTO’s members, currently 162 countries.

On top of that, recent negotiating experience suggests that willingness to accommodate each other’s interests quickly is a scarce commodity in the WTO and even a final agreement cannot be guaranteed.

If that is true, then post-Brexit, the UK can expect a long and rough ride.

Negotiating with diverse countries

To be clear, these negotiations would be about sorting out the UK’s legal status quo in the WTO. They would be separate from any free trade agreement such as with the US, EU or anyone else, although the complicated web of talks would feed into each other.

The UK is already a WTO member, but its membership terms are bundled with the EU’s. Re-establishing the UK’s WTO status in its own right means both the UK and the EU would negotiate simultaneously with the rest of the WTO’s members to extract their separate membership terms. Agreement on the UK’s terms is unlikely before those of the EU.

For its part, the UK would have to negotiate with the EU itself, the US, China, Russia, India, Brazil, and any trading nation or group of nations that matters, large or small, rich or poor. It would only take one objection to hold up the talks because the WTO operates by consensus, not voting, one reason why WTO negotiations take so long.

The UK government would have to balance conflicting interests domestically as well.

This is not an argument for or against Brexit. Proponents on either side can weigh up the costs and benefits and make their own cases. But they cannot assume that becoming an independent WTO member will be simple and quick for the UK.

The only way it could, would be if a post-Brexit UK became — as some propose — much more of a free trader, with low import duties across the board, and minimal subsidies for farmers. This would be simple to establish in the WTO, but domestic opposition would have to be overcome first.

Otherwise, much of the UK’s negotiations in the WTO would be tough, and could still be hotly debated domestically. For example, how much in subsidies for farmers would the UK want to negotiate? Since that would come out of the EU’s entitlement, how much would Brussels want to keep for itself? How much potential protection against imports would the UK want to reserve for its producers? Negotiating those would be complex, with almost all WTO members demanding a say.

Tricky subjects

The complexity comes from the EU’s strange situation in the WTO. The EU is 29 WTO members: the 28 member states plus the EU itself. They have combined “rights” (e.g. to be able to export to other countries, and not to be discriminated against), balanced against shared “obligations” (e.g. to open up to imports from them, and not to discriminate against them).

In the WTO, the EU has agreed to keep its import duties within certain limits. For example, for some types of shoes this is a maximum of 17 percent. That limit applies to all EU members when they import from outside the EU. The EU’s quotas — allowing quantities of certain products to be imported at special lower-duty rates — are for the whole single market, not any individual country such as the UK. Limits on agricultural subsidies are also for the entire EU.

To be an independent WTO member, the UK would be creating its own rights and obligations out of the EU’s. That’s not as simple as it sounds. One reason is because other countries with different interests would want to ensure the balance is also right for them.

Take just one hard-fought issue: low-duty import quotas for high-quality beef, just two of almost 100 EU quotas. The EU opened these beef quotas after lengthy negotiations with Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, New Zealand, Paraguay, Uruguay, and the US.

Extracting UK beef quotas out of the EU’s would require negotiations with all of them, plus possibly other suppliers such as Botswana, India, and Namibia, and definitely the EU itself — Ireland, Germany and France have particularly strong beef lobbies.

While the exporting countries are pressing for the UK’s quota gates to be opened wider, and jostling with each other for paths through the opening, UK farmers would be pushing in the opposite direction. Remember, to reach agreement, the WTO’s consensus rule would apply.

The EU’s black hole

Now comes the surprise. We don’t know what most of the EU’s current commitments in the WTO are. The UK would be negotiating a share of key quantities that are unknown.

The only confirmed commitments on tariffs, quotas, and farm subsidies are from before 2004 when the EU had 15 member states. The EU has expanded three times since then, but in 12 years it has been unable to agree with the WTO membership on revised commitments.

That in itself is a warning. The UK will be negotiating a share of numbers that are unknown, with no guarantee of agreement. There may be practical solutions but again they will have to be negotiated.

Take agricultural subsidies that have a direct impact on prices or on how much farmers produce. The EU’s limit for its (pre-2004) 15 members is €67.2 billion. However, when informing the WTO about its subsidies, the EU says the limit is now €72.4 billion, perhaps from a secret updated draft that has not yet been agreed by the WTO’s membership.

Actual subsidies are currently way below the limits, so the UK might have room to manoeuvre. Unless the UK decided to scrap support for prices or production volumes completely, it might try to negotiate a percentage of the EU’s limit (whatever it is). A number of responses is possible.

The hardest bargaining would take place if Australia and others persisted with their desire for everyone in the WTO to scrap this type of subsidy — allowing only a minimal amount worth up to 5 percent of the value of agricultural production. UK production is currently around £10 billion, implying a £500 million subsidy ceiling, considerably less than the £3 billion some have mentioned for a post-Brexit UK. British farmers would react.

A mountain of work

Some issues would be simpler. Many EU commitments could be converted to the UK’s without the need to negotiate, although the WTO membership would still want to confirm the conversions. This would be the case where no changes are needed.

For example, the UK could continue to observe the EU’s ceilings on tariffs (such as the 17 percent on shoes), and its market-opening pledges in services sectors. It could also simply translate EU regulations — on food safety, animal and plant health, and product standards and labelling — into its own. And so on.

That’s still a mountain of work: the EU (and UK) has around 20,000 products listed for collecting customs duties, thousands of product standards and regulations, and extremely complicated limits on access to its services market.

Besides, the UK would still be applying EU rules. Moving away from them, one of Brexit’s objectives, would require further negotiation or at least peer review in the WTO. (See also BBC Reality Check on a possible “lifetime’s worth of Parliamentary legislative sessions” in order to separate UK law from EU law)

None of this is impossible, but it won’t be sorted out quickly.

This is a slightly updated version of a post that first appeared on the Trade β Blog. A comprehensive report on these issues was published by AgraEurope in March 2016: ‘Brexit’ and WTO — Part 1: The complex search for the UK’s WTO status quo (subscription required) ‘Brexit’ and WTO: 11 facts about the EU and its strange relationship with the WTO (free to view) ‘Brexit’ and WTO — Part 2: Hard bargaining over the UK’s ‘commitments’ (subscription required)

Peter Ungphakorn was a senior information officer with the WTO Secretariat until 2015. Since then he has returned to journalism, writing part time for AgraEurope, Intellectual Property Watch and other publications, focusing mainly on international trade rules, agreements and institutions.


Was the Imperial Federation dead by 1900?

Well Kent should have more influence over the British Government. However, the Imperial Federation is much more expansive than just Britain, so it's only fair that Kent should have less influence than New Zealand, due to it's distance, military vulnerability, lack of development and imperial obligations.

There is always a dynamic with the metropole, while it receives the highest status, wealth and control, it also has to concede to the exterior.

The most durable "empires" have always conceded to the exterior, otherwise everything would fall apart.

Wendell

Julius Vogel

Peg Leg Pom

Except that it's the only viable one. India would be the Hungary analogue, and it would be one half of the Imperial Federation as I see it, with Britain and the settler dominions constituting the other half.

I have been thinking of such an idea recently where there is an explicit distinction made between a Federation of the Dominions (including Britain) and the Indian Raj, but bought together in an twinned fashion, like Austria-Hungary.

The question is how would the arrangement have any sort of stability. If the Raj was to be given the same sort of rights and freedoms that Hungary was it would surely split from the Empire very quickly.

My thoughts it would have to be an alternate settlement from the Mutiny with a pre-1900 PoD where the British recognize that India has to be treated as it's own distinct entity with it's own culture and traditions. To this end it is reorganized into an Indian Raj with Victoria as the 'Bahadur' (or feminine equivalent). Instead of importing masses of British administrators instead the new Raj turns to the anglo-indian community and loyalist Princes, to create it's administrative class though heavily leavened with British advisors.

Meanwhile the white settler colonies are gradually elevated to Dominion status through federating together. In the late 1890s the Irish question is resolved in a similar manner with the United Kingdoms turning itself into federated entity similar to Canada and Australia with home rule begin given to it's component nations. South Africa rises to dominion level as the Boer republics are pressured economically and politically into forming a federation with the Cape and Natal, but other wise maintain their distinctive identities ala Quebec.

The Dominions plus UK form the Imperial Union with it's own representative Senate in the early 1900s. The Indian Raj remains in personal union with the Empire until the mid century where it passes laws to turn itself into an elective moanrchy that rotates the position of Emperor of India through the princely states like OTL Malaysia, and formally separates itself. Though maintains cultural and economic links.

The settler dominions are joined in the union by the East Indies, Malaya and Central Africa (mega Rhodesia) by this point along with a smatttering of city state sna smaller territories like Malta, Gibraltar, Aden, the Falklands, and Hong Kong. Though prolonged civil unrest in both Malaya and Central Africa (think Vietnam war levels of counter insurgency at times) probably leads them to exit the Union. South Africa might wobble a bit too, and I could see it exiting in the late 20th century.


#CRCC Trade Proposals and Update

In this first update for the Commonwealth, Realm & Canzuk Campaign, we are proud to announce that the United Commonwealth Society and CANZUK International have joined, and we have received a lot of interest from a number of other groups and associations, along with many individuals. The CRCC is still under development, but the Daily Globe has been kind enough to offer to host our website, so we anticipate the campaign growing and building inertia.

Here at the CRCC (Commonwealth, Realm & CANZUK Campaign) one of our goals is the benefit of Commonwealth Trade. We have received questions in relation to why this is an economic and not a political project and if the Commonwealth has an integral economic benefit. In this update, we will explore the potential trade agreements the UK can sign with Commonwealth nations, and it is of note that the majority of nations the UK is in negotiations with, or has proposed closer ties are all Commonwealth nations.

For the post-Brexit UK to succeed, a well organised trade strategy with a number of equally eager partners is crucial. It is to this end, that the similarity in cultural norms amongst the UK and the Commonwealth is an asset of considerable importance. These commonalities have been shown to increase trade between two members by up to 30% (Bennett, et al, 13). By investing time and effort into Commonwealth connections, the UK will reap greater economic rewards when compared with most other non-Commonwealth nations. Such benefits are not limited to the UK. There are numerous economic opportunities to Brexit, especially for the Commonwealth. In this article, we will examine these opportunities on a nation-by-nation basis.

On the 29th of March 2017, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) gave official notice to the European Union (EU) that it was leaving the EU as per the result of the referendum. Brexit has therefore begun. While we all aim for the best possible outcome for both sides in future UK-EU relations, it would be a mistake to continue fighting the referendum over again. It would be advisable to examine how the UK can improve its relationship with its traditional partners and allies.

The first point is to dispel the myth that most nations are not economically interested in the UK. According to research by Tim Hewish and James Cleverly MP, the UK is the primary EU destination for Canada, Australia, New Zealand (the CANZUK nations) along with South Africa, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Jamaica (Cleverly & Hewish, 6). Therefore, a new bilateral trading arrangement would be sought by all parties and should be treated with the necessary importance.

Unfortunately, the importance of deepening relations with the African-Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) nations has been questioned, with concerns regarding the size of their economies. However, to view UK-ACP relations as merely second rate continues the faulty logic which resulted in Brexit. Without the support of the BAME (Black, Asian & Minority Ethnicity) population in the UK, Brexit would not have occurred, and their grievances as part of the Vote Leave coalition must be heard. Part of this was the growing feeling of being second class citizens, an error that ought to be addressed swiftly.

Echoing the comments by Professor J.A. Frankel in his landmark paper, Assessing the Efficiency Gains From Further Liberalization, research conducted by Dr P. Ghemawat states that nations that share a language typically trade 42% more (Schumpeter, economist.com). A similar benefit exists for nations with a similar legal code. While the term “common” in Common Law referred to its use and development by “Commoners” in the network-centric, globalist and interconnected 21st Century, ‘Common Law’ has taken on a new definition.

The summed accumulation of these benefits is known as the ‘Commonwealth Advantage,’ and in the research paper, “Trading Places: the ‘Commonwealth Effect’ revisited” it is stated that “the value of trade is likely to be a third to a half more between Commonwealth member states compared to pairs of countries where one or both are not Commonwealth members” (Bennett, et al, 13). It is therefore deducted that a ‘special relationship’ exists between these nations. Due to the benefits of international trade, increasing by between 30-50% would offer greater returns from negotiated agreements than with most other nations.

The few options here are listed from lowest “cost-benefit” analysis to most to the UK. The nations mentioned have all stated they wish for a new agreement with the UK, and in most cases low key negotiations have already begun. It is of note that many other Commonwealth nations have also shown similar interest, so the list is by no means comprehensive.

The Commonwealth itself is an IGO with fifty-two member states, concentrated in the Pacific, Southern Africa & Caribbean regions. Its lack of geographical proximity has developed from the British Empire’s and remains its greatest asset (through diversity) and liability.

All but two of the 15 full, and all five of the associate members of the Caribbean Community, commonly known as ‘CARICOM’, are members of the Commonwealth. These are: Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Lucia, St Kitts & Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago.

Sir Ronald Sanders, the ambassador for Antigua and Barbuda to the US, expressed concern that the Caribbean would be viewed as too small a market and overlooked by the overworked British negotiators (Sanders, The Implications of Brexit…). Current EU-CARICOM relations are at a low, mainly due to the current treaty, the EPA. This ‘Economic Partnership Agreement’ is viewed as an “unequal treaty” in the Caribbean and according to Sir Ronald Sanders, its signature was “a matter of fear, not faith” (Sanders, The Implications of Brexit…).

Therefore, a new basis for trade, development and investment is needed, as although the Caribbean is not of essential importance to the UK, the reverse is true 21% of their exports to the EU go to the UK (Madden, Barbados Today). The option for a new treaty to replace the one-sided EPA offers great opportunities to the CARICOM nations. This could include replacing & augmenting older bilateral treaties such as bilateral health care coverage, which has taken a step backwards in recent years.

Botswana exports between 54 to 56% of all its goods to the UK (Baatweng, Sunday Standard). This phenomenon and the potential threat from cheap agricultural goods has created a counter-intuitive scenario The nations within the European Single Market become significantly less attractive for trade arrangements giving a Brexit-Britain an advantage. As current EU trade regulations in the Common International Trade Policy are deemed to be sufficient by both sides, it would be wise to grandfather in the existing CITP arrangements, as this would involve nothing new and there should be no sticking points. ‘Grandfathering’ refers to the process where the UK would take the EU – other nation treaty and duplicate it so as to ensure the terms continue between the UK and other nation. The benefit of the process is that it is rapidly signed and finalised as no new terms need to be negotiated, and therefore UK-Botswana and any other nation relations are precisely the same before and after Brexit. The drawback is that no new processes or terms can be added, for that would require new negotiations. It seems that Canada, however, has proposed an unusual two stage plan where the CETA (Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement) is grandfathered in, and then a entirely new agreement is developed.

UK-Kenya relations are among the strongest in East Africa. The UK has emphasised the importance of Kenya and has made a series of suggestions for future relations, including relaxing EU restrictions on importing flowers and tea. Current UK government investments in the tea industry are expected to increase exports from the 45 million kilograms imported in 2015 (Cornel, The Star). Kenya, like most Commonwealth nations, complains about the restrictive UK visa policies. For this and many other reasons, it is believed that a much delayed and needed visa policy reform is being considered.

Kenya, due to its size and open market economy (one of the most economically open Commonwealth Republics after Singapore), is deemed to be a primary candidate for membership in the hypothetical C11 trade area based off the proposals by Tim Hewish (24). This would be a Free Trade Zone between the UK, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, India, South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria, Ghana, Singapore, and Malaysia. The groundwork of the C11 is already being laid due to the large number of bilateral trade arrangements signed and under development.

As the C11 would be an entirely new arrangement, Kenya should be a priority for the UK negotiation team. It is feared, however, that the C11 will take more than two years to finalise after the granting of the official go-ahead so a separate UK-Kenya trade agreement is being proposed and worked upon by the Foreign & Commonwealth Office.

India is one of the two Commonwealth BRICS nations, and historically was the Jewel of the Empire. To this day, India is the largest Commonwealth nation by population. With a GDP of $2.1 trillion, it is the second largest economy in the Commonwealth (Trading Economics) and the largest democracy in the world. India is a nuclear power, will be the largest nation by population in the future and developing with a rapidly increasing middle class. The current value of UK-India trade is $14.3 billion, and UK-India trade is currently increasing (Banga, 3). What is most notable is the genuine desire to boost bilateral trade, a key part of this being a new trade agreement.

Despite providing the second largest number of doctors to the UK and numerous other close ties, further attempts to broaden and deepen UK-India ties stall, mainly due to the restrictive UK Visa system. Following Brexit, the government has the chance to construct a fairer immigration system that does not discriminate against non-EU nationals, and it is being supported by the Conservative back-benches (Hope, Telegraph.co.uk). It is to be hoped that PM May will accede to this request from both the Indian Government and her own MPs. Such a liberalisation will be key to the much vaunted UK-India Free Trade Agreement, which would offer great benefits for all, with tUK exports estimated to increase by $2 billion, and Indian Exports by $1 billion (Banga, 4, 6).

India is also one of the three Commonwealth nuclear powers, and a great asset to the geo-political stability in the region. The UK has close defence relationships with India, yet these could be greatly strengthened. An option might be to offer India membership of the Five Power Defence Agreement. A more comprehensive proposal might be the creation of a Commonwealth Defence Pact, a mutual defence & development treaty similar to NATO and the failed American SEATO.

Another of the old Dominions & BRICS nation, South Africa is a developing country well situated to play an important role in UK trade. UK-South African ties have greatly improved since the election of the majority ANC government, which has also seen considerable domestic development, and healing of internal divisions, possibly best seen in recent electoral victories of the Democratic Alliance, the multi-ethnic opposition party. Already the ‘gateway to southern Africa’, it’s the UK’s largest African trading partner (Hewish, 64). The UK is also the largest EU destination for South African exports at 18% (Cleverly & Hewish, 13). These two facts led to the swift proposals for closer ties following Brexit by both sides, a powerful riposte to the common allegation of Brexit being a racist & xenophobic reaction: It is hard to imagine the ANC-led government to be in favour of closer ties with a white-supremacist populated nation.

Closer UK-SA economic ties would also benefit from the African dislike of the EU’s agricultural policies and strengths, and Britain’s new position outside of the EU is a considerable asset to South Africa, as well as many other African nations. Hewish concludes that it would be simplest to build off the current EU-South Africa deal (the European Free Trade Area – Southern African Customs Union agreement), as opposed to constructing an entire new agreement (Hewish, 64). It is also of note that South Africa would be a member of the conceptual ‘C11 Free Trade Area’. Closer UK ties with the Southern African Customs Union should also be considered, as, like Caricom, it would offer the UK the ability to reach agreements with several nations with only one agreement.

The UK’s relation with Singapore and Malaysia are firmly established and remain very close. Both have open and developed economies, the most developed in the region. Both nations use the foundation of Common Law, and have high levels of English literacy. In relation to language, English is an official language both but it is in much more common use and 80% of Singaporeans are fluent in English (Singapore Market). When these key advantages are taken into account, they are two of the best Commonwealth Republic markets, open and eager for closer economic ties with the UK. It’s relations with the UK are also unusually good for a decolonised nation, possibly due to the fact both were a UK protectorates and not colonies.

Indeed, the sole pact that could be described as a “Commonwealth Defence Treaty” is the ‘Five Powers’ Defence Arrangement’ between the UK, Singapore Australia, New Zealand and Malaysia.

In relation to Malaysia, the reasons for closer UK-Malay ties have again manifested themselves security issues in the Malay Peninsula, Borneo and South China Sea. In relation to trade, repeated statements by Cabinet members of both the UK and Malaysia during state visits have echoed a mutual desire for closer ties.

The UK currently exports £2.4 billion to Malaysia with a trade surplus of £0.9 billion, and is currently in “advanced talks” for economic agreements (Hewish, 38, 54). On the Malaysian side, they have purchased around 10% of the commercial property in London and there are 17,000 Malaysian students in the UK (Fox, gov.uk). The Commonwealth Exchange’s expectation on achieving a UK-Malaysian & Singapore trade agreement by 2021 was ⅘ (Hewish, 50).

UK-Malaysian ties developed from the threat posed to the Malay States by Colonial powers, and to some extent, this threat has surfaced again. Although the Dutch & French are no longer potential adversaries by any means, the South China Sea & Indochina region has again become destabilised by the actions of a hegemon – the People’s Republic of China, whose expansionist policies have created much concern.

Singapore, like Malaysia is an economically-open nation, topping the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business list, and leads many other similar series (Hewish, 40). It is an extremely open and competitive nation, and well worth closer economic ties. Singapore was able to transfer into being a first world nation in a short period of time and remains one of the most developed nations in the region, with a remarkably high GDP and GDP Per Capita. UK-Singapore trade has continued to grow in terms of value, and Singapore currently exports $3.3 billion to the UK, while the UK exports £7.2 billion worth of goods and services to Singapore, meaning the UK’s surplus is £3.8 (Trading Economics) (Hewish, 38). As an economic superpower, closer ties with Singapore should be a primary goal with the UK and would offer considerable benefits for few hardships due to the openness and economic policies of the modern trading city-state.

Australia, Canada & New Zealand (CANZUK)

Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the UK (CANZUK) are, in many respects, remarkably similar. It is one of the few cases where a “one-size-fits-all” policy would likely work successfully, as when all four nation’s statistics are viewed, they show similarity. For this reason, the creation of a ‘Single Economy,’ with free movement of goods, services, capital and persons would be an easily achieved, workable goal.

Reinforcing this is the considerable level of support for these ideas in all four nations. All four CANZUK nations have a similar culture, standardised norms and economic policies unique in the modern world. Indeed, the former Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott suggested that a UK-Australia agreement could be merely one page long, which must be a record by a considerable length (Cleverly & Hewish, 4). When viewed from a socioeconomic standpoint, these four nations are considerably more developed that other Commonwealth nations and this is the foundation for any CANZUK idea.

CANZUK International, the group advocating Free Movement has researched the four nations in great detail and their masterly proposals are available on their website, and we at the CRCC wholeheartedly recommend their goals.

It would be worthwhile to point out that ‘Free Movement’ as espoused by both the CRCC and CANZUK international (previously the CFMO) is fundamentally different from the European model of Free Movement each nation involved would maintain complete sovereignty and control over their borders, the ability to refuse individuals or limit net migration. Furthermore, the goal of a CANZUK single economy would not be to create a single state, but rather to assist in economic development, closer ties, mutual defence and offer greater opportunities to the citizenry of each nation.

It should be noted that from a historical point of view, India, Pakistan, and South Africa all ought to be included in any ‘CANZUK’ proposal. From a political standpoint, all 16 Commonwealth Realms should be included in such a single economy. Yet, regrettably, neither would work at the moment. The Indian government would not be interested, as it would lead to “brain-drain”. For the other nations, the life expectancy, GDP per capita, crime rates, population size, average wage, and unemployment rate would place such a single economy under considerable strain. The final, and ultimate, reason why such a wide proposal would not work would be the lack of popular support in all the nations for such a Realm or Dominion Free Movement Area at the current date. The goal of the single economy is to lead to greater economic development and offer smaller nations greater geopolitical standing as part of a mutual association. It a matter of sovereignty and economics, and is most definitely not a political project.

A further point is that the CANZUK Single Economy would not be limited to the four nations. As mentioned above, when any Realm reaches a similar socio-economic standing, they would be able to apply to join the ‘Single Economy’. Furthermore, it need not even be expressly limited to the 16 Realms South Africa, Kenya and Singapore, are Commonwealth Republics, which could also most likely join the agreement if they wished. Pakistan, merely by the population size, would place great strain on the system as they have 3 and 20 times the population of the UK and New Zealand respectively. India’s population, six times larger than Pakistan’s, would be ten times larger than all four original nations combined. It needs be pointed out that there is a middle-ground between the current restrictive visa policy and complete free movement.

For both the developing and developed Commonwealth nations, Brexit offers an opportunity to grow trade, bilateral investment and relations with the UK. The above list is by no means exhaustive. Many other Commonwealth nations have expressed support for a new geopolitical and economic relationship. It is to be hoped that mutually beneficial trade links are developed for the good of all, and this is the aim of the Commonwealth, Realm & Canzuk Campaign.

1. Baatweng, Victor. “BREXIT: NO IMMEDIATE IMPLICATIONS FOR BOTSWANA BEEF EXPORT.” BREXIT: No Immediate Implications for Botswana Beef Export | Sunday Standard, Sunday Standard, 27 June 2016, www.sundaystandard.info/brexit-no-immediate-implications-botswana-beef-export. Accessed 16 Apr. 2017.

2. Banga, Rashmi. “Brexit: Opportunities for India.” Commonwealth Trade Competitiveness Briefing Paper, 2017, doi:10.14217/ca804af9-en.

3. Bennett, Joanna, et al. “Trading Places: the ‘Commonwealth Effect’ Revisited.” Trading Places: the ‘Commonwealth Effect’ Revisited, thercs.org/assets/Uploads/Trading-Places-the- Commonwealth-effect-revisited.pdf. Accessed 7 Mar. 2017.

4. Cornel, Ernest. “Kenya’s Trade with UK to Rise Post-Brexit.” The Star, Kenya, The Star, Kenya, 25 Jan. 2017, www.the-star.co.ke/news/2017/01/26/kenyas-trade-with-uk-to-rise-post-brexit_c1494100. Accessed 30 Apr. 2017.

5. Cleverly, James and Hewish, Tim, Reconnecting with the Commonwealth: the UK’s free trade opportunities, Free Enterprise Group. Found at http://www.freeenterprise.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/FEG_Commonwealth-Trade_web-1.pdf

6. Fox, Liam. “Malaysia and Britain: Partners in a Post-Brexit World.” Malaysia and Britain: Partners in a Post-Brexit World – GOV.UK, UK Government , www.gov.uk/government/speeches/malaysia-and-britain-partners-in-a-post-brexit-world. Accessed 27 Apr. 2017.

7. Hope, Christopher. “Commonwealth Citizens Should Have UK Visas Fast-Tracked after Brexit.” The Telegraph, Telegraph Media Group, 11 Feb. 2017, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/02/11/commonwealth-citizens-should-have-uk-visas-fast-tracked-brexit/. Accessed 3 May 2017.

8. Madden, Marlon. “Regions Anxious for Trade Deal with Britain Post-Brexit.” Barbados Today, 6 Apr. 2017, www.barbadostoday.bb/2017/04/07/regions-anxious-for-trade-deal-with-britain-post-brexit/. Accessed 3 May 2017.

9. Sanders, Sir Ronald. “The Implications of Brexit for the Caribbeanâs Future Relationship with Britain and the EU.” The Round Table, vol. 105, no. 5, Feb. 2016, pp. 519–529., doi:10.1080/00358533.2016.1231313.


Brexit

Following the UK’s exit from the European Union, citizens of Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovenia are no longer entitled to a £55 discount on UK work visa fees that other EU member states enjoy.

Slovenian MPs have now joined ministers from the four other excluded nations urging Brussels to ensure fair and equal treatment of all EU citizens.

EU diplomats fear that post-Brexit Britain is likely to discriminate between EU nationals in other looming immigration matters – including decisions over who can participate in the UK’s Youth Mobility Scheme (YMS). The YMS is currently open to nine developed countries who don’t have EU membership.

A spokesperson for the European Commission said: “While the EU and the UK are free to determine their respective visa policies, the UK has committed - in the Trade and Cooperation Agreement - to treat all nationals of EU member states equally for the purposes of short-term visas.”

“The UK cannot decide to grant a visa waiver for short-term travel to citizens of certain member states, whilst excluding others,” the spokesperson added.


G40 - New UK Pacific Nation

The United Kingdom Pacific economy will now operate as a separate nation apart from the United Kingdom Europe economy. This new UK Pacific nation will absorb all ANZAC units in the initial setup, as well as all original ANZAC territories making a combined starting income of 27 IPCs. Also, the UK Pacific will use ANZAC gray pieces, ANZAC roundels, and ANZAC’s turn in the order of play.

Calcutta will remain the UK Pacific capital, however, Sydney is no longer a capital city unless promoted as one due to Political Exile (see below). Any territory controlled by one of the two UK nations (UK Pacific, or UK Europe) regardless of location on the board, will count toward the overall income of the individual UK nation that controls it.

*It’s recommended that you purchase more appropriate control markers to represent the new UK Pacific nation.

Political Exile (UK nations only)

If and when London is captured by an Axis power and the UK Europe nation has relinquished all their income, they may continue to collect for territories they still control on the map. However, Ottawa must now become their new capital city for the remainder of the game, even if London is liberated.

If and when Calcutta is captured by an Axis power and the UK Pacific nation has relinquished all their income, they may continue to collect for territories they still control on the map. However, Sydney must now become their new capital city for the remainder of the game, even if Calcutta is liberated.

New UK National Objectives

New National Objectives for the United Kingdom Pacific

5 IPCs if the Allied powers control India, Malaya, and New South Wales.

New National Objectives for the United Kingdom Europe

5 IPCs if the Allied powers control Gibraltar, Malta, and Egypt

5 IPCs if there are no Axis submarines on the Europe map (Baltic sea excluded)

You know what? I think I like this idea better than the Halifax rules.
Another idea would be to use the grey ANZAC pieces to represent all the UK Pacific. Then the UK Pacific would be a truly different power. Still use the same rules for which UK controls which territories – UK London controls all territories on the Europe board except for West India and including Western Canada. UK Pacific controls all territories on the Pacific board except for Western Canada and including West India.
So, say for example the “ANZAC” infantry in West India walks over and activates Eastern Persia, it falls under UK London control.

Here are the production unit house rules our group will be playing in addition to the new UK Pacific Nation rules.

Production Unit Profiles:

Industrial Complex:
Produces up to 10 units
Maximum damage of 20
Unoperational at 10 damage
May never be purchased
Immediately downgraded to a major factory once captured

Major Factory:
Produces up to 5 units
Maximum damage of 10
Unoperational at 5 damage
May never be purchased
Immediately downgraded to a minor factory once captured

Minor Factory:
Produces up to 3 units
Maximum damage of 6
Unoperational at 3 damage
May be purchased at a cost of 12 IPCs
May only produce units that cost 8 IPCs or less
May be placed on any territory with a victory city (Islands included),
or any territory with an IPC value of 3 or greater (Islands not included)

Production Unit Rules:

Only production units on territories that have been captured are downgraded by one level. Production units on territories that have been liberated remain the same level, and must be relinquished to the territory’s original owner.

Production units may never be upgraded, however there is one exception the United States will upgrade their major factories on Western, Central, and Eastern United States to industrial complexes automatically once they are at war.

Strategic bombers conducting SBRs only receive a +2 damage bonus if they have departed from an operational air base.

Nations may only purchase and place minor factories on the board if they are at war with at least one other nation.

Production Unit Setup:

Industrial Complexes
United Kingdom
Western Germany
Germany
Northern Italy
Russia
Japan
India

Major Factories
Western United States
Central United States
Eastern United States
Quebec
France
Southern Italy
Novgorod
Volgograd
New South Wales

Minor Factories
Normandy
Southern France
Ukraine
Union of South Africa

Additional Rule Suggestions

New National Objectives for the Soviet Union

The Russian “National Prestige” NO is now split into 2 separate bonuses when Russia is at war with Germany.

5 IPCs if there are no Axis warships is sea zone #125, and the Allies control Archangel.

5 IPCs if there are no Allied units on any originally controlled Russian territories.

New National Objectives for Japan

The following new Japanese NO will replace “outer perimeter”

and in addition to all other Japanese NOs

New National Objective for China

The following new Chinese NO will replace “the Burma Road”

New National Objectives for Germany

The following new German NO will replace “Afrika Korps”

and in addition to all other German national objectives…

When Germany is at war with the United States…

New National Objectives for Italy

In addition to all other Italian national objectives…

When Italy is at war with the United States…

I think this idea has a lot of promise!

In fact I think I would be a lot more willing to accept the division of the British Empire into UK and UK Pacific, if UK Pacific included Anzac. At least then it would make sense.

Regarding the Capital though, I think choosing Calcutta would be a mistake, and I strongly favor Sydney for the capital. Here is my logic… India/Calcutta is already on the normal war path for Japan. It would be more dynamic from a gameplay standpoint to have the British Empire Pacific capital in Sydney rather than Calcutta, as this would give Japan a greater incentive to invade Australia and would put them more into conflict with USA. Also, in the event that Calcutta falls, The British Empire Pacific would still have a base of operations out of Sydney. Most importantly though, the capital in Sydney would encourage at least some spending in Australia, rather than just totally abandoning it for India, which would be the clear priority if Calcutta was a Major and the Capital and the principle target on the normal Japanese war path (which leads to the center). To keep Sydney relevant to the gameplay, I believe if it should serve as the place where Japan can steal the purse from the British Empire Pacific.

The thing is, if you go Calcutta for the capital, then I can easily imagine this new combined Pacific player making the reasonable calculation that its “just not worth it” investing in Sydney at all, or ever to buy any ships there, instead just dropping the whole pile on India. But if Sydney was the capital, and Sydney controlled the purse, then there would be a strong reason to spend a portion of the money there, to defend the capital (and maybe a reason to buy ships as well, to move those defensive units out, on occasion at least).

Sydney can be a minor complex and a capital.

There is already precedent for this with Italy, since the Italian capital is a Minor complex. Even though they have a Major in N. Italy, it is the Minor that holds the purse.

Likewise the New Pacific Empire power could have their Major in Calcutta, but the capital in Sydney, at the Minor. They would of course still have a huge strategic incentive to spend at Calcutta, but this gives them a reason to do something other than stack India with their increased cash flow.

I like the idea of the player division using the gray scultps. My only concern would be the limited number of roundels that comes in the box. But aesthetically, I do like the gray units. Another question, what to do with those Anzac units in Egypt then? Make them European UK? On general principle, I don’t like movement restrictions by theater, since I think it becomes difficult to justify, when Japan is allowed to move into Europe, but UK isn’t allowed to move into the Pacific. I don’t think it would be as problematic if the British Empire Pacific was a fully independent player Nation that included Anzac.

Finally Turn order…
The New Pacific power should move on the Anzac turn in the sequence, to help distinguish them as a separate player. This would improve game flow, since it would break up the already long America - China - UK turn, and let Italy go before the British Empire Pacific.

ps. Here is another reason why I think this could work, and another reason to support using the Anzac unit sculpts for this concept…

Right now, in the OOB game, UK and UK Pacific units are not distinguished in the turn order or phase sequence, the only difference is how these units enter play. Once in play however, they are treated exactly the same. In practical terms, this means that UK Europe units can move onto the Pacific side of the board, link up with UK Pacific units, and then proceed to make attacks together at the same time.

The most common example would be launching Mech out of Africa or Persia, to link up with UK Pacific units in India, and then, once joined together in the same place, to make combat movements in unison. Ships are likewise treated the same, the only difference being how they enter play. It doesn’t matter whether a ship was built in S. Africa or Calcutta, once its on the map, all British units are treated the same for the purposes of movement OOB.

Now, unlike the OOB situation, if you take UK Pacific and transform it into a full player Nation (one that includes Anzac) and call it British Empire Pacific, with its own distinct sculpts and its own position in the turn order, I believe that splitting them up by theater to restrict their movement would no longer be necessary to offset the increase in income.

Sure UK Europe could still move units onto the Pacific side of the board to join with the British Empire Pacific, but they wouldn’t be able to attack at the same time now. This is very significant to the gameplay, critical, because although they could still conduct a unified defense, they couldn’t just springboard together into China with joint attacks anymore. They would move their units at different times, albeit still “piggy backing” one another in the turn sequence, but no longer a joint force. In short, they’d have to conduct attacks separately, rather than having their movement restricted by theater.
What do you think?

Finally, again to the Capital question…
If you give the British Empire Pacific a starting income of 27 ipcs plus an additional potential 15 ipcs from National Objectives and then make Calcutta their capital, where do you suppose they will spend all that money? Because, I think they will drop it all into India. Absent some incentive to do otherwise, India is the only choice that makes any strategic since. They have a Major there already, which means if they are able to achieve even one of their NOs, there is a fairly strong chance they can stack 10 infantry a round in Calcutta, or perhaps even 10 mech. The set up situation being what it is, that’s like 30 infantry on India, before Japan can even get in range, which I think will make India very difficult as a target, and at the same time, the only target that matters on the Pacific side of the gameboard.

Now contrast this with a Capital at Sydney. Here the British Empire Pacific player has to strike a balance. If they leave Sydney/Australia too weak, then Japan may well launch the full weight of their forces against it, seize the capital, take the money, and eliminate ability of the British Empire Pacific to produce new units. On the other hand, if they spend too much in the defense of Australia, then they may be leaving India vulnerable. While taking India would not eliminate the ability of the British Empire Pacific to produce units, it would nevertheless be a major strategic blow to the Allies. So I think if you put the capital in Sydney, then you will introduce strategic interest on a part of the board that doesn’t have a whole lot OOB.

USA would have an added incentive to protect Sydney, which could affect Japan’s plans on the DoW, and which might even give the British Empire Pacific and real incentive to make an unprovoked declaration of war against Japan.

In any of the various models which have been proposed above, one point that may need to be considered and/or clarified is whether Canada (if it’s treated as part of the UK) would be subject to a Europe/Pacific split. In other words, would the Canada-based income and units from the parts of Canada on the Pacific board only be usable on the Pacific side (as is the case with ANZAC), while the Canada-based income and units from the parts of Canada on the Europe board only be usable on the Europe side? The issue is important because, in Global 1940, most of Canada is part of the the Europe board, so most of that income might in principle be restricted for use on the Europe side. (Incidentally, keep in mind that Canada is treated differently on the first and second editions of the Pacific map. The British roundel in Pacific/2 is an error [listed in the official errata] and there is a single Western Canada territory rather than a BC + Yukon split, although the total IPC value is the same.)

This are all great contributions, thanks guys…

I can understand the reasoning for making Sydney the Pacific capital, but there is also a good argument for keeping it Calcutta. The biggest one for me is, making Sydney the Pacific UK capital is inconsistent with the way the UK operates on the Europe side. Of course as always, these ideas are available for everyone to mold and play test as they wish, I myself like the Calcutta capital. I’m still debating on wether or not to use the AZAC gray to separate the UK Pacific military from Europe, because in our group the UK is a very undesirable nation to play, but if I keep it all one… players might be more willing to play the UK.

I’m also thinking about modifying our current production unit rules to fit this Pacific British Empire format, like not removing minor factories from the board when captured, and leaving the India IC a 10 producer and a 5 producing Major factory on Sydney. I’m also more drawn to the idea of political exile over Sydney as a capital, this way if London is captured, the UK Europe continues to collect an income with Ottawa as their new capital, and if Calcutta is captured, the UK Pacific continues to collect an income with Sydney as their new capital. This brings in an idea of Commonwealth military support as well as political resolve in the face of an India, or England capitulation.

I like the idea of keeping Calcutta as the UK Pacific capital and leaving it as a Major IC along with making Sydney a Major Factory able to produce 5 units. Also, using Sydney as a secondary capital, like Ottawa on the Europe board.
I also like Black Elk’s idea of moving UK Pacific to ANZAC’s place in the turn order. Also still like the idea of using ANZAC pieces for UK Pacific. You could still put the 2 ANZAC infantry in Egypt. After all, UK Pacific and ANZAC is still a part of the greater British Commonwealth.

CWO Marc,
Western Canada on the Pacific board is still part of the UK Europe economy. West India on the Europe board is part of the UK Pacific economy. There is no Europe/Pacific split for Canada or India.
The main thing to remember is if UK Pacific units take a territory on the Europe board, the income goes to UK Europe. If UK Europe units take a territory on the Pacific board, the income goes to UK Pacific.

So if the UK gray naval ships off India go toward Africa, do they get replaced by UK baige pieces?

So if the UK gray naval ships off India go toward Africa, do they get replaced by UK baige pieces?

No, they stay grey and move on their own turn. This goes with Black Elk’s idea of moving UK Pacific to ANZAC’s place in the turn order. This would make them truly a separate power.
So while UK Pacific units can go to the Europe board, perhaps to back up a UK Europe fleet, they would still not move until their own turn. In this case, you would have the same problems as you do with a combined US/UK fleet. Together on defense they can really back each other up but if they want to move and attack, they have to do so separately.
The main difference here is unlike US/UK, in this case you would have an Axis (Italy) moving in between the UK Europe and UK Pacific turns. So you would have to take that into consideration. What might Italy do if the UK Europe moves it’s ships leaving UK Pacific’s ships momentarily alone.
Of course, in the case of Germany or Japan, it still wouldn’t be a problem.

I love the ideas and agree that capitals should be transferred once London and Calcutta are captured: Ottawa and Sydney.
I believe Pacific UK must follow UK though. Italy cannot be inbetween.

Well with enough HRs or set up changes, anything can be made to work. But for the rule as written above, here is my concern with Calcutta as the capital and the NOs as currently worded…

In the first round the British Empire Pacific starts with 27 ipcs, or I guess 28 if you want to switch W. India and W. Canada around, but its pretty much the same difference.

Lets say just for the sake of interest, that Japan does not DoW in the first round, then on the British Empire’s first turn, the British do the Java play and bring 3 fighters in range from Australia New Zealand, which they can now use on attack the following round, since there is no separate Anzac nation. British take Sumatra. With the NOs as worded, they are way up on income, now approaching 50 IPCs.

Japan cannot let this happen, so you effectively force J1 DoW with these NOs, which is already the likely plan for Japan anyway, but here it becomes even more critical. Now lets assume J1 DoW, with the British Empire losing Kwangtung and probably one of the 4 ipc islands or the New Guinea NO. Now British Empire Pacific is back down to collecting in the Low 30s. If they lose New Guinea and Kwangtung, then all 3 of their NOs are lost. This leaves the British Empire Pacific with little money to spend in Australia, and little reason to do so. I expect they will drop the whole pile in India, and use their extra fighters from Java to start launching attacks out of India, without ever spending a dime on Sydney.

I think if we want to pursue this idea further we may need different NOs for the British Empire Pacific. Right now we have NOs which read “for control of All original territories” and these are just too easy for the enemy to disrupt, and strategically kind of uninteresting since they don’t encourage anything specific to occur. The New Guinea NO is ok, from the standpoint that USA could recover it, but the other two NOs are out as soon as Japan declares war. More specific NOs tied to a single territory (or at most 2 territories together) would be better. For example +5 for control of Malaya, or +5 for control of Queensland, or something similar. This would encourage Japan/British Empire Pacific to fight over specific areas (areas further outside their normal comfort zone), and at least discourage them from abandoning Australia or Singapore to the Japanese indefinitely. You could do the back up capital idea and it would probably work on balance, provided you had stronger NOs to ground the fighting somewhere other than just India itself, which will already be a huge magnet anyway.

One advantage of using UK sculpts is that you have more total units and roundels to work with, but it does seem rather unfortunate to have an entire Anzac unit set that gets no use. I think I still like the idea of making them Gray with a separate turn. Otherwise you have to come up with a set up change for Egypt, since the OOB rules would no longer work there (with the 2 Anzacs becoming British) or perhaps that makes no difference to your balance aims. But the two combined would seem to be rather challenging on Axis, since Cairo and India would both be that much harder to crack.

Go gray, I say, with a separate turn, and you won’t have to make as many set up changes. Or if the idea is to make a lot of set up changes, then tweak away and fix the whole game. No half measures. If you’re going to go for it, go all the way. I feel like Halifax was set aside prematurely, because it didn’t go far enough in the set up changes. Having already made a bunch of set up alterations, it didn’t carry them through to the logical next step of a complete redesign of the whole board haha. The best Mod is either very few changes to keep it as close to OOB as possible, or just open pandoras box already, and lets make a full scenario that really does balance well for both sides, while still being fun to play for each individual power.

Right now, Italy is the power that no one wants to play in all my games even moreso than UK, since they just get raided and raided and raided. Which is why I thought it might be nice to give them a break, and have British Empire Pacific move on Anzac’s turn in the sequence. Italy gets hosed all the time now. Alas, OOB convoy rules, they just don’t do a whole lot for me hehehe. On the whole I like this idea a lot. I feel that the British Empire Pacific would make more sense, than a lone Anzac and separate UK Pacific, which feel weirdly out of place in Global 1940.2, even if they might be interesting in Pacific 1940. Better to join Anzac and UK Pacific, one less nation to worry about. Takes it from 9 players down to 8, same as Halifax, just in a different way.

Well with enough HRs or set up changes, anything can be made to work.

Absolutely, everyone has enough favorite house rules which differ from another person’s favorite house rules, that these ideas won’t ever be played the same from table to table.

In the first round the British Empire Pacific starts with 27 ipcs, or I guess 28 if you want to switch W. India and W. Canada around, but its pretty much the same difference.

Case in point, I also thought of switching those territories to make it a more pure border… however, my goal is to not change more than what’s needed especially if my group is used to things being a certain way.

Lets say just for the sake of interest, that Japan does not DoW in the first round, then on the British Empire’s first turn, the British do the Java play and bring 3 fighters in range from Australia New Zealand, which they can now use on attack the following round, since there is no separate Anzac nation. British take Sumatra. With the NOs as worded, they are way up on income, now approaching 50 IPCs.

Japan cannot let this happen, so you effectively force J1 DoW with these NOs, which is already the likely plan for Japan anyway, but here it becomes even more critical.

If I’m reading this right, you’re assuming that the UK would claim NOs while not at war, but the National Objectives in post #1 state that the UK must be at war with Japan in order to collect these bonuses. When Japan does DoW on the Pacific Allies, all they would need to do is take Hong Kong to prevent the #1 NO, and the UK ain’t getting that back any time soon. Unless the Allies have claimed all 4 Dutch territories, or that Japan has completely ignored the Island grab (which is highly unlikely) the #2 NO is equally difficult to obtain after Japan declares war. That leaves the #3 NO which should be easy enough to collect and protect, so if the UK Pacific is making more than 5 IPCs in NOs… Japan is not playing well.

Now lets assume J1 DoW, with the British Empire losing Kwangtung and probably one of the 4 ipc islands or the New Guinea NO. Now British Empire Pacific is back down to collecting in the Low 30s. If they lose New Guinea and Kwangtung, then all 3 of their NOs are lost.

I hope we are on the same page about the Dutch Islands, The UK will not collect a National Objective if the Dutch territories remain Dutch… only if the UK or the USA have control markers on all Dutch Islands will they collect 5IPCs.

Now British Empire Pacific is back down to collecting in the Low 30s. If they lose New Guinea and Kwangtung, then all 3 of their NOs are lost. This leaves the British Empire Pacific with little money to spend in Australia, and little reason to do so. I expect they will drop the whole pile in India, and use their extra fighters from Java to start launching attacks out of India, without ever spending a dime on Sydney.

This is all theoretical, there hasn’t been a single play test yet and it’s hard to say how much gets spent where. I can say for sure that if I’m playing the UK… I’m gonna be sure that Calcutta is secure before dropping boats off Sydney, just like I would protect London before dropping a factory in Egypt. I know this because I personally have difficulty finding the value in ANZAC purchases, for me… the mainland is the more important fight, and if Japan goes for Sydney, well than I now have the money to protect that as well.

I think if we want to pursue this idea further we may need different NOs for the British Empire Pacific. Right now we have NOs which read “for control of All original territories” and these are just too easy for the enemy to disrupt, and strategically kind of uninteresting since they don’t encourage anything specific to occur. The New Guinea NO is ok, from the standpoint that USA could recover it, but the other two NOs are out as soon as Japan declares war. More specific NOs tied to a single territory (or at most 2 territories together) would be better. For example +5 for control of Malaya, or +5 for control of Queensland, or something similar. This would encourage Japan/British Empire Pacific to fight over specific areas (areas further outside their normal comfort zone), and at least discourage them from abandoning Australia or Singapore to the Japanese indefinitely. You could do the back up capital idea and it would probably work on balance, provided you had stronger NOs to ground the fighting somewhere other than just India itself, which will already be a huge magnet anyway.

Obviously I don’t want to hand cuff the UK Pacific with NOs that can’t be achieved… but doesn’t every nation have at least 1 impossible NO that they can never claim? On the other hand, we don’t want to stack the odds against Japan with bonus NO money for the UK, that would only make Calcutta and Sydney impossible territories to take.

I made the new NOs on the fly knowing that the old NOs for the UK and ANZAC would be obsolete… so I’m listening to any alternative NO packages.

One advantage of using UK sculpts is that you have more total units and roundels to work with, but it does seem rather unfortunate to have an entire Anzac unit set that gets no use. I think I still like the idea of making them Gray with a separate turn. Otherwise you have to come up with a set up change for Egypt, since the OOB rules would no longer work there (with the 2 Anzacs becoming British) or perhaps that makes no difference to your balance aims. But the two combined would seem to be rather challenging on Axis, since Cairo and India would both be that much harder to crack.

I’ve got no problem putting my gray ANZAC pieces away if I have to, I’ve got tons of other game pieces I’m not currently not using. I also don’t mind the ANZAC troops in Egypt being british, the troops in Canada are British. Also, the Allies should be strong in Africa… it’s the only place on the board they can hold and build from (most times).

Go gray, I say, with a separate turn, and you won’t have to make as many set up changes. Or if the idea is to make a lot of set up changes, then tweak away and fix the whole game. No half measures. If you’re going to go for it, go all the way. I feel like Halifax was set aside prematurely, because it didn’t go far enough in the set up changes. Having already made a bunch of set up alterations, it didn’t carry them through to the logical next step of a complete redesign of the whole board haha. The best Mod is either very few changes to keep it as close to OOB as possible, or just open pandoras box already, and lets make a full scenario that really does balance well for both sides, while still being fun to play for each individual power.

Write up an option #2 for gray pieces as well as a separate turn, and I will copy and paste it into post #1.

Right now, Italy is the power that no one wants to play in all my games even moreso than UK, since they just get raided and raided and raided. Which is why I thought it might be nice to give them a break, and have British Empire Pacific move on Anzac’s turn in the sequence. Italy gets hosed all the time now. Alas, OOB convoy rules, they just don’t do a whole lot for me hehehe. On the whole I like this idea a lot. I feel that the British Empire Pacific would make more sense, than a lone Anzac and separate UK Pacific, which feel weirdly out of place in Global 1940.2, even if they might be interesting in Pacific 1940. Better to join Anzac and UK Pacific, one less nation to worry about. Takes it from 9 players down to 8, same as Halifax, just in a different way.

Don’t get me started with Italy, I’m this close to replacing all their units with German and go back to classic style… but that’s a totally different thread.

Just real quick, since my phone is about to run out of batteries hehe… about the DoW.

I believe if Japan doesn’t DoW, then UK has the option to make an unprovoked declaration of war on Japan, which would award 45 ipcs total (assuming Java and Sumatra.) Is that correct? Or 46 if they take Dutch New Guinea instead of Java. I think anyway. Which means they’d almost always DoW, one side or the other? I’ll look when I get home…

Oh wait no, you are totally correct, I misread your second NO. I thought it was the same as the Anzac NO for New Guinea. But I see now it says “all original Dutch territories.” OK so that seems a bit more manageable, from the perspective of India not going too monster. But in that case, is the NO really achievable for the British?

I get the idea that OOB, many nations have impossible NOs. But I think that’s a bad thing generally. NOs that can’t be achieved just take up space in the rulebook haha. If they can be achieved, then they serve as gameplay drivers for both sides. One side wants to achieve it and tries, the other wants to deny it, so it prompts both sides to act. This is the essence of a contested NO. But if the NO is impossible, then both sides simply ignore it, and it does nothing for the gameplay. In such cases the NO should be scrapped, since players shouldn’t have to memorize stuff that doesn’t come into play. I understand the OOB model, 1 safe NO, 1 contested NO, 1 impossible NO. I just don’t really think it’s the best model. Better to have just have the contested NOs to focus the gameplay in historical directions. A safe NO is fine, but should only be given if the nation really needs additional income to function on balance. Impossible NOs are pretty irrelevant though, I’d rather see contested NOs in their place, and NOs that encourage people to do historical things, that they wouldn’t do otherwise, without an NO incentive.

I wouldn’t want to derail the adoption of this idea by providing a bunch of alternative variants at this point. I’d rather see one strong mod that has better chances of adoption. If that uses UK units and Calcutta for the capital then that’s certainly workable. We just need solid NOs to keep Sydney from being too irrelevant. I really prefer focused NOs to the ones with more sprawling conditions. If they NO says “all territories a, b, c, x, y, z” I just think they are less likely to drive the gameplay, since they are so easy for the enemy to shut down.

Let’s take the Dutch islands NO proposed vs the original Anzac NO for New Guinea (the one I mistook above).

With the original Anzac NO there is a reason for Japan to invade Dutch New Guinea. Under the new draft there is little reason to do this, since Japan can disrupt the NO just as well from Java or Borneo etc. places where they already want to be. From the UK perspective, the additional requirement (for Allies to control all Dutch territory) makes going for a place like Dutch New Guinea even less likely, so they probably give up on the NO altogether, as too impossible to invest in achieving.

I’d be sad to see the grey Anzacs go, but the reality is that there just aren’t enough Anzac roundels in the Box, and too few units to fully support an expansionist British Pacific. Whereas there are a bunch of normal beige UK units.

Haha that’d be funny, just ditch Italy altogether and make them German. Though I’d rather rewrite the convoy rules, than eliminate Italy, since then it’d be 8 Allies vs 2 Axis and kind of ridiculous hehe. But I get where you’re coming from. It’s frustrating to play a nation that is broke all the time and can’t contribute to the war effort.

ps. ok so lets take another look at the UK Pacific and Anzac NOs from the OOB game, if they were all taken together it might read something like

5 if the British Pacific control both Kwangtung and Malaya, and is at war with Japan.

5 if Allies control Malaya, and all of the original Anzac territories, and is at war with Japan.

5 if the Allies (not including Dutch) control all of Dutch New Guinea, New Guinea, New Britain, and the Solomon Islands, and is at war with Japan.

The first two are fairly weak, and both dependent on control of Malaya, with an added condition tacked on that is very hard to maintain. They are unlikely to be achieved unless Japan is losing badly. These are what we might call endgame resolution NOs, because they award money that can only be consistently achieved once the player is already winning. Japan can shut down both fairly easily at the outset, almost as soon as they are at war, all they have to do to deny the Allies 10 ipcs is take Malaya.

Why not simplify this NO and just say British Empire Pacific gets +5 if they control Malaya?

This would mean that both Japan and British Empire Pacific would contest this territory directly. It wouldn’t be off the table just because Kwangtung is under Japanese control (very likely) or because the Japanese managed to take a single Anzac territory (fairly simple). If you want to drive fighting over Malaya, then just put the focus on the single territory, and not saddle it with a bunch of extra requirements that make the focus territory irrelevant. Malaya +5 is simple, and such an NO has the benefit of also being relatively easy to remember. Here we’ve taken 2 unlikely NOs and replaced them with 1 NO that is much more likely to be contested.

Now lets look at the final OOB NO. How about something more straightforward, like +5 for control of New Zealand. Since this is one of the more remote territories which Japan might take, and which in the war, it was a major strategic objective for the Allies to keep this supply route open. I mean that’s why Solomons and all the rest were so significant after all, right? So why not just be more direct, and boost the territory with a NO bonus, to give both sides a reason to fight over it.

Or what if, instead of saying you need control of “such and such” you simplified it and made it more universal?

Like +1 ipc for every pair of valueless islands that Allies control in the Pacific, or maybe +1 ipc for every 3 valueless islands controlled in the Pacific, (once at war with Japan of course). This would put about a dozen ipcs up for grabs and activate all the islands where conflict never occurs, making them relevant to the gameplay. Instead of NOs for Japan and America, what if we used the NOs for the British Empire Pacific to encourage fighting over all these valueless islands? This makes a kind of sense historically, since Japan wanted to cut off the British Pacific and seperate them from their American Allies. The NO could reflect this in a general way, to provide interest for the gameplay.

Just musing on ideas. I just think, if you’re going to go through the effort of removing a nation from the game, and bringing the British Empire Pacific into being, then why not take the same opportunity to make the Pacific NOs as interesting to the gameplay as possible. Not something that is so challenging to achieve, as to be practically irrelevant, but something that really puts the gameplay onto the islands. Because that is what everyone wants, and which the Pacific fails to deliver on most A&A boards.

Otherwise I just don’t even see the point of having NOs in A&A, if they only become a factor in exceptionally rare instances, then they might as well not even exist. We should instead try to make them critical to the balance of power on the gameboard. Something that can swing back and forth. Don’t you think? I mean, since we have the opportunity here with this overhaul of the British Pacific.

Why not simplify this NO and just say British Empire Pacific gets +5 if they control Malaya?

This would mean that both Japan and British Empire Pacific would contest this territory directly. It wouldn’t be off the table just because Kwangtung is under Japanese control (very likely) or because the Japanese managed to take a single Anzac territory (fairly simple). If you want to drive fighting over Malaya, then just put the focus on the single territory, and not saddle it with a bunch of extra requirements that make the focus territory irrelevant. Malaya +5 is simple, and such an NO has the benefit of also being relatively easy to remember. Here we’ve taken 2 unlikely NOs and replaced them with 1 NO that is much more likely to be contested.

Now lets look at the final OOB NO. How about something more straightforward, like +5 for control of New Zealand. Since this is one of the more remote territories which Japan might take, and which in the war, it was a major strategic objective for the Allies to keep this supply route open. I mean that’s why Solomons and all the rest were so significant after all, right? So why not just be more direct, and boost the territory with a NO bonus, to give both sides a reason to fight over it.

Or what if, instead of saying you need control of “such and such” you simplified it and made it more universal?

Like +1 ipc for every pair of valueless islands that Allies control in the Pacific, or maybe +1 ipc for every 3 valueless islands controlled in the Pacific, (once at war with Japan of course). This would put about a dozen ipcs up for grabs and activate all the islands where conflict never occurs, making them relevant to the gameplay. Instead of NOs for Japan and America, what if we used the NOs for the British Empire Pacific to encourage fighting over all these valueless islands? This makes a kind of sense historically, since Japan wanted to cut off the British Pacific and seperate them from their American Allies. The NO could reflect this in a general way, to provide interest for the gameplay.

I really find these NOs much better.
Such NO " Like +1 ipc for every pair of valueless islands that Allies control in the Pacific" should be even simplified to “1 ipc for every valueless islands that Allies control in the Pacific”.
This will make IJN in the mood to take those Islands. This will better reenact their WWII strategy.
However Japan will need some IPCs to make it valable strat.
Maybe revised the Outer perimeter defense to 4 islands out of 5?

I changed it to 3 equally obtainable NOs… others can be house ruled.

New National Objectives for the United Kingdom (Pacific)

5 IPCs if the United Kingdom controls Malaya.

5 IPCs if the Allied powers control all territories conecting the Burma road.

5 IPCs if the Allied powers control all original ANZAC territories.

Now we’re cookin’

I dig it! Going to slate a game for this weekend

Now we’re cookin’Â

I dig it! Going to slate a game for this weekend

Yep, my group will be playing this Saturday.

Gonna go back to regular 2ndE production rules, but we’ll modify a couple of Russian NOs in addition to these house rule ideas.

Just spit balling here, but imagine if all the Axis peices in G40 we’re one color, and all the Allied units one color. No national objectives (maybe 5 IPCs per victory city), both sides at war, and the Axis side going first.

I changed it to 3 equally obtainable NOs… others can be house ruled.

New National Objectives for the United Kingdom (Pacific)

When at war with Japan…

5 IPCs if the United Kingdom controls Malaya.

5 IPCs if the Allied powers control all territories connecting the Burma road.

5 IPCs if the Allied powers control all original ANZAC territories.

And what about this slightly different ones, YG?

5 IPCs per territory if Pacific British Empire controls Kwangtung and/or Malaya.
Theme: Maintenance of the empire considered vital national objective.

Why did you let aside this ANZAC OOB NO which promotes combat over islands ?
5 IPCs if the Allies (not including the Dutch) control Dutch New Guinea, New Guinea, New Britain, and the Solomon Islands.
Theme: Strategic outer defense perimeter.

Shouldn’t you add Dutch New Guinea to this one:
5 IPCs if the Allied powers control all original ANZAC territories and Dutch New Guinea.
Theme: Strategic southern defense zone.

I changed it to 3 equally obtainable NOs… others can be house ruled.

New National Objectives for the United Kingdom (Pacific)

When at war with Japan…

5 IPCs if the United Kingdom controls Malaya.

5 IPCs if the Allied powers control all territories connecting the Burma road.

5 IPCs if the Allied powers control all original ANZAC territories.

And what about this slightly different ones, YG?

5 IPCs per territory if Pacific British Empire controls Kwangtung and/or Malaya. ?
Theme: Maintenance of the empire considered vital national objective.

Is this a house rule? because the oob NO I believe says " 5IPCs for control of both Kwangtung and Malaya".

@Baron:

And what about this slightly different ones, YG?

5 IPCs per territory if Pacific British Empire controls Kwangtung and/or Malaya. ?
Theme: Maintenance of the empire considered vital national objective.

Is this a house rule? because the oob NO I believe says " 5IPCs for control of both Kwangtung and Malaya".

Yes and No (not in spirit).
In the original NO both territories were required to get the 5 IPCs bonus.

I just think Kwantung can be still part of it, but it gives another 5 IPCs (as it is the most difficult part of the NO to achieve, as Black Elk told).

So, by keeping Kwantung in this NO, you keep the general direction given by the OOB NO.

I also edit the previous post:
@Baron:

Why did you let aside this ANZAC OOB NO which promotes combat over islands ?
5 IPCs if the Allies (not including the Dutch) control Dutch New Guinea, New Guinea, New Britain, and the Solomon Islands.
Theme: Strategic outer defense perimeter.

Shouldn’t you add Dutch New Guinea to this one:
5 IPCs if the Allied powers control all original ANZAC territories and Dutch New Guinea.
Theme: Strategic southern defense zone.

I changed it to 3 equally obtainable NOs… others can be house ruled.

New National Objectives for the United Kingdom (Pacific)

When at war with Japan…

5 IPCs if the Allied powers control all territories conecting connecting the Burma road.

This one, was it only part of the Chinese’s NO?

Just spit balling here, but imagine if all the Axis peices in G40 we’re one color, and all the Allied units one color. No national objectives (maybe 5 IPCs per victory city), both sides at war, and the Axis side going first.

HHMMMMM!

Well you know I’m all for ditching NOs in favor of a VC bonus haha, but this one would require a lot of rehashing, and probably another box purchased, as I’m not sure I’d have enough of any two color sets to try it out. Since the DoW would be out, I’d guess you’d want to try it under total war conditions and no China rules? In this case Axis would be much stronger in the Med I’d guess, but a lot weaker in the Pacific. Interesting thought experiment though.

As to the current discussion on NOs, my approach would be to see what it looks like without the NOs, then add them based on what the balance looks like.

So for example, if the British are getting screwed then give them an easy NO, if the British are too strong then give them a more challenging one. Or similarly, if Japan totally ignores the Pacific in favor of India, then give the British an NO that is more focused on the islands. Things like that. I think the difficulty with G40, is trying to put the NOs, before we know what the balance is. I think its better when the NOs respond to some need in the initital balance.


Alliance of anti-racism groups calls for racism enquiry

Following the release of the report, an alliance of 16 anti-racism groups called for an inquiry into the extent of institutional racism within the Home Office. The alliance said: “The Windrush Lessons Learned Review proves institutional failures to understand racism.”

The 275-page report was commissioned following the exposure of the scandal amid former Prime Minister Theresa May’s ‘hostile environment’ policy. The scandal led to the resignation of then Home Secretary, Amber Rudd.

The 16 groups have now urged a review of the Home Office’s UK visa and immigration policies, to determine whether they are discriminatory.

While the report did not officially label the Home Office as institutionally racist, the deputy director of the race equality thinktank the Runnymede Trust, Zubaida Haque said, said that ‘the government needs to ask serious questions of Home Office culture, attitudes and immigration and citizenship policies, which seemingly discriminate against black and ethnic minority British citizens.’

Ms Haque said that the report exposes that the injustice of the Windrush scandal was ‘no accident, but a very clear indication of institutional failures to understand race and racism.’


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Our main source of funding comes from donations from the general public - regular and one-off donors, community events, sponsored events/challenges, community groups and schools. Since 2014 we have increasingly been the recipient of grants of various sizes - from £200 to more than £15,000 - provided by various Trusts and Foundations committed to supporting development work. In May 2016 HOPE UK also received a Community Grant from Global Giving for a special project working with 200 women in a community that has received access to clean water, teaching them basic business skills. We have also developed links with a new start-up business that adopted HOPE from the outset, giving a portion of its profits to our clean water and livelihood projects. We are always looking to develop relationships with businesses, schools, churches and community groups to further our mission.

Where are your offices?
HOPE's head office is in Canada but in the UK our fundraiser is based in Bristol. Our volunteers are based throughout the country and our trustees are in London, Cambridge, Coventry, Leicestershire and the USA. The wider HOPE partnership also has offices in Australia, Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, New Zealand and the United States of America. For contact information, please refer to our Contact Us page.

How are you governed?

HOPE UK currently has six trustees, all of whom have served in this voluntary capacity for several years, have visited our work in Ethiopia and have long-standing involvement with HOPE as supporters and fund-raisers. The Board meets three to four times a year. Its annual report and financial statements are Independently Examined by Wilkins Kennedy LLP, in London.

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As the UK government gears up to deal with the will of voters, four paths to trade in Europe appear that merit consideration

  1. EEA membership
  2. EFTA membership
  3. WTO rule-based membership, sans EEA or EFTA
  4. Negotiated trade deals that are none of the above

EEA membership would qualify Britain to trade with other EEA member nations, all of which are located in Europe, but not all are members of the European Union.

From the EEA website:

The EEA Agreement provides for the inclusion of EU legislation covering the four freedoms — the free movement of goods, services, persons and capital — throughout the 31 EEA States. In addition, the Agreement covers cooperation in other important areas such as research and development, education, social policy, the environment, consumer protection, tourism and culture, collectively known as “flanking and horizontal” policies. The Agreement guarantees equal rights and obligations within the Internal Market for citizens and economic operators in the EEA.

What is the EEA Not?

  • Common Agriculture and Fisheries Policies (although the Agreement contains provisions on various aspects of trade in agricultural and fish products)
  • Customs Union
  • Common Trade Policy
  • Common Foreign and Security Policy
  • Justice and Home Affairs (even though the EFTA countries are part of the Schengen area) or
  • Monetary Union (EMU).

The Agreement on the European Economic Area, which entered into force on 1 January 1994, brings together the EU Member States and the three EEA EFTA States — Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway — in a single market, referred to as the “Internal Market”.

Switzerland is not part of the EEA Agreement, but has a bilateral agreement with the EU. You can read more about this agreement on the European Commission website, and on the Swiss Federal Administration website.

EFTA membership governs free trade relations between EFTA States, which in 2016 are Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. Britain was a founding member of the EFTA in 1960 until 1973 when it joined the EC. It would need to apply to the EFTA in order to become a member.

From the EFTA website:

The Association is responsible for the management of:

  • The EFTA Convention, which forms the legal basis of the organisation and governs free trade relations between the EFTA States
  • EFTA’s worldwide network of free trade and partnership agreements and
  • The European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement, which enables three of the four EFTA Member States (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway) to participate in the EU’s Internal Market.

EFTA was founded by the Stockholm Convention in 1960. The immediate aim of the Association was to provide a framework for the liberalisation of trade in goods amongst its Member States. At the same time, EFTA was established as an economic counterbalance to the more politically driven European Economic Community (EEC). Relations with the EEC, later the European Community (EC) and the European Union (EU), have been at the core of EFTA activities from the beginning. In the 1970s, the EFTA States concluded free trade agreements with the EC in 1994 the EEA Agreement entered into force. Since the beginning of the 1990s, EFTA has actively pursued trade relations with third countries in and beyond Europe. The first partners were the Central and Eastern European countries, followed by the countries in the Mediterranean area. In recent years, EFTA’s network of free trade agreements has reached across the Atlantic as well as into Asia.

EFTA was founded by the following seven countries: Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Finland joined in 1961, Iceland in 1970 and Liechtenstein in 1991. In 1973, the United Kingdom and Denmark left EFTA to join the EC. They were followed by Portugal in 1986 and by Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995. Today the EFTA Member States are Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland.

World Trade Organization (WTO) membership is perhaps the easiest way forward as Britain (and virtually all nations) are already members and the WTO is merely a standardized set of rules that govern trade between nations.

The present ruleset governing UK trade is the EU ruleset, meaning that who the UK trades with, tariff rates, and other rules and conditions have been decided by 28 EU nations — and not always in the interests of the UK — but in the combined interest of 504 million EU citizens.

The main thrust of this means that WTO rules would continue and that the UK would not be allowed to charge higher tariffs on EU-sourced imports, than what the EU charges on UK imports into the EU. Although the UK could certainly decide to charge lower tariffs than the EU charges. That could be a significant benefit for some UK industries.

There are other benefits to WTO membership. And as most nations are WTO members anyway, the ruleset is well-understood around the world.

In February 2014, the Swiss voted in a referendum to no longer pursue EU membership and left the bloc. The government of Switzerland has therefore negotiated a series of bilateral trade agreements with the European Union AND is a member of the EFTA, but not the EEA.

Of course, WTO rules still apply — unless both parties agree to abrogate or change some of the WTO rulesets.

Keep in mind that both the EFTA and EEA are European trading area agreements and don’t apply anywhere else in the world, while the WTO applies everywhere.

Therefore, non-EU trade will be largely governed by WTO rules (as is the case with most countries) while Britain’s trade with the EU could take several different paths.

Any combination of WTO, EFTA, or EEA, or bilateral agreements that supercede WTO rulesets could be negotiated between Britain and the EU.

At the end of it all, why did 17 million+ voters choose to Brexit?

Two main themes appeared to gain considerable traction during the campaign.

One, the democratic deficit in Brussels, and two, the wholly unregulated movement of people from eastern Europe and the Middle East/Levant and a complete breakdown of the Schengen Area border control system.

Brexit effectively solves the democratic deficit problem in Brussels by returning governance to the House of Commons and the House of Lords. While the mass migration problem is solved as Brexit returns sovereignty of Britain’s borders to the UK government.

The revised EFTA convention (the Vaduz Convention) extends beyond free trade in goods, and includes provisions on free trade in services and the free movement of capital and of persons. None of these should be problematical to the UK given that the Vaduz Convention only applies between its members and so would not act as a gateway for the free movement of persons from the r-EU or elsewhere. All four EFTA states have standards of living comparable to or even higher than the UK so do not present any mass migration risk. — Brexit and International Trade Treaties, The European Free Trade Association (EFTA)

Recommended Read Brexit and International Trade Treaties by Lawyers for Britain

None of this can occur until Article 50 is triggered and a 24 month clock begins ticking to end Britain’s membership in the European Union.

It would be quite wonderful if Prime Minister Theresa May would hold a press conference every six months to inform Britons of the various areas of progress and ongoing obstructions until the Brexit process is complete — a process that could take as long as 5-10 years from the June 23, 2016 start date.

We are in uncharted waters and Britons are excited to be getting their country back. They know it’s going to take time, resolve, and they know full well that there will be difficulties along the path to restoring Britain’s full sovereignty. But the payoff in 5-10 years will be brilliant.


Mills & Reeve: Life Science Law

December's announcement of a Trade and Cooperation Agreement to steer the next steps in the future relationship between the UK and the EU was a welcome development.

We have taken a look at the areas likely to be most significant for the life sciences sector - see Life sciences and the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement

No general presumption of confidentiality for documents submitted to the EMA

We have commented before on court rulings over the attitude of the European Medicines Agency (EMA) to keeping regulatory filings confidential. In a move likely to concern applicants for marketing authorisation, appeals against two of those decisions have come down on the side of disclosure.

Two Merck group companies, MSD Animal Health in Germany and Intervet International, objected to release to an undisclosed third party of a series of toxicology test reports that they had submitted to support the approval of Bravecto, a treatment for tick and flea infestations in dogs. Merck argued that confidential material in the reports meant that they should not be released.

PTC Therapeutics, an Irish pharma company with a conditionally approved product (Translarna) for the treatment of Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy, objected to the disclosure of the main clinical study report supporting the product’s approval. Translarna had been approved without comprehensive clinical data on the basis of unmet medical need for patients suffering from a life-threatening disease. An undisclosed third party had applied for access to the report.

No general expectation of secrecy

In both rulings, the European court emphasised openness in carrying out the work of Europe’s bodies and agencies as a “core EU objective”. It rejected the idea of a general presumption of confidentiality, saying that an applicant should identify specific passages that should be kept confidential and explain why.

The court also rejected an argument based on the international TRIPS Agreement which deals with intellectual property rights within the framework of the World Trade Organization. TRIPS Article 39(3) includes an obligation for signatory states to protect confidential material included in pharmaceutical and agrichemical dossiers. Again, without details of why disclosure of the material claimed to be confidential would harm the marketing authorisation applicant’s interests, the EMA should not be expected to keep it secret.

This is unwelcome news for applicants. The EMA will not have to accept general requests to keep material submitted to it confidential. Applicants will need to identify a “concrete and reasonably foreseeable risk” that the information could be used in a way that will harm its commercial interests.

No-deal Brexit planning for life sciences businesses – new guidance and scenario planning

Brexit uncertainty remains a fact of life for business. Next week’s Parliamentary vote on the Withdrawal Agreement is unlikely to resolve matters. For the time being, planning for no-deal is set to stay with us as a time-consuming and costly distraction from other priorities.

Clearly the regulatory issues for life sciences businesses are substantial, with most regulation based on EU law and much of it implemented through EU institutions. New guidance from Government addresses a number of areas, and helps to put some of the issues in context.

Medicines regulator, the MHRA brings together relevant Government guidance and communications with industry on its website – Making a success of Brexit. The latest addition to this collection is a Further guidance note produced as a response to the consultation on draft legislation, and giving more detail on the arrangements in the event of no deal. We highlight below a few points from that guidance:

Medicines Regulation

The MHRA will take on regulation for the UK market. The guidance puts forward a package of measures largely replicating the European system, and offering some attractive features to maintain the UK’s competitiveness as a research and development location. The proposals include:

  • Grandfathering of Centrally Authorised Products:[1] Transitional legislation will ensure that Centrally Authorised Products will benefit from an automatic UK marketing authorisation for a limited period. Marketing authorisation holders can opt out of this “grandfathering” process. If they wish to retain the UK MA, MAHs will have to provide baseline data for grandfathered UK MAs by 29 March 2020. Processing of variations will require at least basic baseline data to have been submitted.
  • MA assessment routes: new assessment procedures for products containing new active substances and biosimilars are planned. These will include a 67-day review for products benefiting from a positive EU CHMP opinion, a full accelerated assessment for new active substances taking no more than 150 days and a “rolling review” process for new active substances and biosimilars still in development.
  • Abridged applications would need to reference UK authorised products. However, this would include Centrally Authorised Products that had been converted to UK MAs and also unconverted Centrally Authorised Products granted before Brexit.
  • Incentives for orphan medicines will be offered, including fee refunds and waivers, and a 10-year exclusivity period. The EU’s pre-marketing orphan designation will not be replicated, as a separate UK designation is not seen as providing a substantial additional incentive for developers.
  • Data exclusivity and incentives for paediatric investigation plans and data exclusivity will largely replicate the current EU legislation, at least initially.
  • New UK-specific legal presence requirements will be introduced for holders of marketing authorisations and Qualified Persons (QPs).[2]
  • Arrangements for recognition of QP certification from EU countries are planned. Wholesalers will need to familiarise themselves with the details of this system as there are specific requirements designed to ensure public safety.
  • Some elements of the Falsified Medicines regime will fall away, as the UK is unlikely to have access to the central EU data hub recording dealings with individual packs of medicines. The future of this regime in the UK will be evaluated.
  • The UK plans to permit ongoing parallel importation of medicines authorised elsewhere in the EU where the MHRA can satisfy itself that the imports are essentially similar to a UK-authorised product. Parallel import licence holders will have to comply with new requirements such as establishing a UK base.

Medical devices

Plans for the future regulation of medical devices are less well developed. A further consultation will be carried out before changes are made. Importantly, the UK intends to track the implementation of the new EU laws on medical devices and in vitro diagnostic medical devices due to apply from May 2020 and May 2022.

The guidance recognises that UK Notified Bodies will lose their status under EU legislation in the event of no-deal. Products they have certified will no longer be validly marketed.

The UK will take steps to minimise short term disruption by continuing to allow marketing of devices in conformity with the EU legislation and also those certified by UK Notified Bodies. It will continue to recognise existing clinical investigation approvals and will not require labelling changes. New medical devices will need to be registered with the MHRA, although grace periods of up to 12 months after Brexit day are provided to give manufacturers time to comply.

Clinical trials

Much of the clinical trials system operates nationally and can continue, and the UK will continue to recognise all existing approvals. For new trials, a sponsor or legal representative could be based in the UK or in country on an approved list – initially including all EU and EEA countries.

The UK would no longer have access to the European regulatory network for clinical trials, and pan-EU trials will presumably require an EU-based sponsor or legal representative.

The UK intends to align with the new EU Clinical Trials Regulation to the extent that it can. This is unlikely to include access to the EU clinical trials portal, but a new UK clinical trials hub will be introduced to provide a similar central information resource for UK trials.

Scenario planning for your business

These regulatory changes form just part of the picture for life science businesses, many of whom must also contend with a range of other issues. A number of our clients are already planning for different scenarios. Our experience indicates that the issues needing consideration fall into the following categories:

Please get in touch if you would like to discuss your arrangements with us.

[1] Centrally Authorised Products are those which have been through the European Medicines Agency’s approval process resulting in a single approval for the whole EU.

[2] A Qualified Person is an experienced professional responsible for certifying that medicines comply with applicable legal requirements.

Balancing transparency and confidentiality: orphan drug producer fails to prevent disclosure of clinical trial report

New Jersey-based biotech company Amicus Therapeutics focuses on treatments for rare metabolic diseases. Its lead product, Galafold (migalastat), received European marketing approval for the treatment of Fabry disease in May 2016. The drug benefits from an orphan drug designation, which brings with it advantages like protocol assistance and ten years of market exclusivity. 

Later in 2016 Amicus learned that the European Medicines Agency (the EMA) had been asked for documents underlying the marketing authorisation, including the clinical study report, under the Transparency Regulations. These regulations allow public access to EU institution documents.

Is the clinical study report confidential?

Amicus proposed limited redactions to the report. The EMA accepted these and informed Amicus of its decision to disclose the redacted report. Shortly afterwards, Amicus changed its mind and told the EMA it considered the whole report to be confidential. Amicus argued that the report should not be disclosed based on the exception to the right of access in Article 4(2) of the Transparency Regulations:

“The institutions shall refuse access to a document where disclosure would undermine the protection of commercial interests of a natural or legal person, including intellectual property…unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure.”

The EMA disagreed with Amicus. It relied on Article 4(6) - any parts of a document that are not covered by an exception should be disclosed. So access to the document could only be refused if the entire document was shown to be confidential. Amicus asked the European court to overrule this decision.

The European court’s decision 

Amicus argued that clinical study reports should benefit from a general presumption of confidentiality. But the court was very clear that the right to access in the Transparency Regulations applies to all documents, and clinical study reports do not fall into any special category. A party opposing access must show specifically how its commercial interests would be undermined, and “cannot merely plead the existence of inherent confidentiality, or merely allege infringement of fundamental rights in abstract terms.”

Amicus’s second argument turned on the proper balance between disclosure and publication. Disclosure would harm their interests by:

  • allowing competitors to take advantage and obtain an authorisation for a competing product both within and outside the EU
  • undermining their ability to obtain an authorisation outside of the EU and
  • compromising their ability to license know-how in the report to partner companies around the world.

The court disagreed. Amicus had followed the legal requirements and the protocol as set out in EMA guidelines and had not shown any novelty in their models, analyses or methodologies. Disclosure of the report would not reveal any “roadmap” to competitors. It did not include information on the composition or manufacturing of Galafold, and competitors would have to conduct their own trials in order to successfully develop a medicinal product. And Galafold benefited from the market exclusivity granted to orphan drugs.

Amicus had not identified which parts of the report were commercially confidential, despite having been asked by the EMA to do so.

What can we learn from this ruling?

The EMA is increasingly focused on transparency and its approach has repeatedly received support from the European court. In February this year, it supported the EMA’s decision to release documents in three landmark rulings, in which pharmaceutical companies argued commercial confidentiality.  In those cases, as here, the court focused on the failure to produce any concrete evidence as to how release of the documents would undermine commercial interests.

The EMA is committed to transparency and companies will have to do more than plead commercial interest to successfully argue an exception to the Transparency Regulations. Identifying specifically how disclosure will undermine its commercial interest, and showing that this is a real possibility rather than merely hypothetical, is essential. To argue an entire document is confidential will no doubt be difficult, and a more pragmatic approach of redaction is likely to prove more fruitful.

No-deal Brexit guidance on patents and SPCs

The UK’s departure date from the EU is now six months away, with no guarantee that the planned Withdrawal Agreement will be finalised. With that in mind, the UK Government has issued a  series of “technical notices” on what businesses can do to prepare for a no-deal Brexit.

European Patents to stay as they are

Patents granted by the European Patent Office are governed by the European Patent Convention. This is not part of the EU’s legal structures and so is largely unaffected by Brexit. This means that no action is necessary to maintain continued protection of patents granted through this system.

Any Unitary Patents to give rise to separate UK rights

Europe’s planned new Unitary Patent and Unified Patent Court are intended to offer a streamlined patent enforcement process. Although much of the groundwork has been done, the new patent and court are currently held up pending the outcome of a German constitutional challenge. The UK has ratified the Unified Patent Court Agreement and intends to stay within the system after Brexit if possible. This will depend on whether it takes effect at all, and whether the other member countries are willing to make the necessary adjustments to enable the UK to remain a member.

If the UK finds itself obliged to withdraw from the system, the “no-deal” notice promises that any Unitary Patents already in existence will be replicated in “equivalent UK protection”.  It is far from clear when any Unitary Patents will be granted and so this may not have any practical effect, unlike the promise to replicate the many existing EU trade marks and designs made in the notice on trade marks and designs.  

UK businesses will still be able to use the Unitary Patent to protect their inventions in most EU countries.

The patent term extension afforded to pharmaceutical and plant protection products by the SPC system is based on EU law. However, these regulations will become part of UK law automatically through the Withdrawal Act 2018. And although based on EU regulations, the certificates themselves are granted by national patent offices on a country by country basis. Very little will change in the short term, and pending applications and granted certificates will not be affected by Brexit.

Biotech inventions

The EU’s Biotech Directive excludes from patentability some biotech activity – the sequence or partial sequence of a gene without further inventive work, processes for human cloning or modifying the germline and uses of human embryos, for example. This has been implemented into UK law and, in the short term at least, will continue to apply as it does now.

Regulatory review and experimental activity exemptions

Experimental activity benefits from several exemptions to patent infringement. The general experimental use exemption is included in UK law and will remain in place after Brexit.

There are also specific exemptions from patent infringement of activities relating to regulatory approval of human and veterinary medicinal products (commonly known as the Bolar exemption). These have been incorporated into UK law in both a narrow and a broader form. The narrow exemption applies only to activity to apply for an abridged marketing authorisation for a medicinal product under EU law. The broader exemption, introduced in 2014, exempts a much wider range of “medicinal product assessment” activity aimed at compliance with regulatory requirements anywhere in the world.  Both will continue to apply unless changed.

You can read more about Brexit and how it might affect you here.

No-deal Brexit guidance for life sciences businesses

The first wave of the UK Government’s no-deal Brexit guidance has more to offer the life sciences sector than most others. Five of the 25 documents focus on medicines, blood products, organs, medical devices and clinical trials.

You may also be interested in other documents in this collection, such as that which considers the EU research funding programme Horizon 2020 and the regulation of GMOs - these are not discussed further in this article.

The guidance issued emphasises that the Government is working hard to reach a deal with the EU, and believes that this is achievable. However, the possibility of a no-deal Brexit stays on the cards until a UK/EU withdrawal agreement is settled and ratified. With that possibility in mind, the Government is offering planning guidance to industry to prepare for the no-deal scenario. This can be contrasted with the guidance published a few weeks ago on preparation for the implementation period and beyond, assuming that an withdrawal agreement is reached.

What does the new guidance cover?

The guidance for a no-deal scenario relating to the life sciences sector covers the following areas:

The papers dealing with organs, tissues and cells, and with blood and blood products outline a fairly limited set of changes that would follow a no-deal Brexit. These areas are harmonised by EU Directives, implemented nationally through UK regulations. These regulations will remain largely unchanged, at least initially, through the operation of the Withdrawal Act 2018. The UK will become a “third country” after 29 March 2019 for the purposes of this area of law, and new arrangements such as written agreements to cover import and export of human tissues and cells will be needed. Affected organisations are encouraged to consult with the relevant regulators for support, and more detailed information will follow.

The papers addressing regulation of medicines, medical devices and clinical trials, submitting regulatory information and batch testing of medicines are more complex. Regulation in these areas is already closely harmonised across the EU, with the involvement of central EU organisations (such as the European Medicines Agency), and are subject to ongoing change. As above, existing EU law will be largely replicated in UK law through the operation of the Withdrawal Act. New EU laws that are agreed but not yet in force (e.g. the new regulations dealing with medical devices and clinical trials) will not, although the UK Government intends to implement their main provisions.

However, some major changes would follow a no-deal Brexit. The UK’s role as a participant in and beneficiary of the central EU systems and structures would fall away entirely in a no-deal scenario. Separate UK approvals and authorisations would be needed for products benefiting from an EU-wide authorisation (such as an EU market authorisations for medicines).

The guidance promises recognition at least in the short term for already-authorised products (recognition of CE-marked medical devices and automatic conversion of market authorisations for Centrally Authorised Products (CAPs), for example) and would accept batch-testing carried out in an EU or EEA country. But businesses would need to deal directly with the MHRA for all UK market issues, and would need to apply to the MHRA for approval of new products intended for the UK market. Market authorisation holders could be EU based until the end of 2020, after which transfer to a UK-established MAH would be required. New generic applications will have to be based on reference products authorised in the UK, as the MHRA would not have access to EU data.

A consultation process is planned for early autumn, to invite views on how these changes will work in detail with a more comprehensive technical notice to follow. Although Government engagement with what are detailed issues is welcome, it is late in the day and leaves little time for planning. We will continue regularly updating this blog as matters continue apace.

Consultations on free trade agreements – an opportunity to shape the future

The Department of International Trade has launched public consultations on possible free trade agreements with the United States, Australia and New Zealand, as well as possible accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The plan would be to finalise new agreements during the implementation period envisaged by the draft EU/UK Withdrawal Agreement. The agreements would take effect from January 2021.

The United States, Australia and New Zealand are some of our closest strategic allies with whom we have no existing trade agreements. The US is the UK's largest single national export market. Australia and NZ have a commitment to modern, high quality trade agreements. While there are many other markets the UK will look to for new agreements in the future, agreements with these three countries could provide a strong start to delivery of the UK's independent trade policy. 

The CPTPP is an existing agreement involving Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. It is signed, but not yet in force, and can be viewed in full on the New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade website.  If the UK were to accede to the agreement it would account for 17% of global GDP. Covering a broad range of goods, services and investment as well as addressing areas like the digital economy and intellectual property, the agreement is an ambitious successor to the now defunct Trans-Pacific Partnership developed under Barack Obama. An assessment of the impact of joining for the UK can be seen here. 

The four consultations are available online. They will remain open until 26 October.

Brexit report highlights industry challenges

The life sciences sector is particularly exposed to Brexit. The close integration of the UK’s regulatory and research environment with that of the EU, and the international nature of the industry, means that separation is likely to be difficult and disruptive.

The set of challenges currently facing the industry are carefully explored in a recently-published UK Parliamentary report on the impact of Brexit on the industry (Brexit, medicines, medical devices and substances of human origin). The report brings together views from across industry, the public sector, clinical practice and the charitable sector. It highlights the importance of patient safety and access to the best public health protection which lie at the heart of decision-making in this area, with continued support of the UK-based industry coming a close second.

Too small to go it alone

The report focuses on the problem at the heart of Brexit for life sciences – as a standalone economy the UK is too small to go it alone, and so must align with another, larger system in order to remain at the forefront of the industry worldwide.

“The UK’s share of the global life science industry, approximately 3%, means that as a country we are too small to ‘go it alone’, by creating a standalone regulatory system.”

The best option, the report concludes, is the closest possible ongoing regulatory alignment with the EU. The report considers, as an alternative, the prospect of alignment with the US regulatory system overseen by the FDA. This might offer benefits in the form of early access to medicines – producers often prioritise the US for launch of new drugs. However, it entails both political risk (the FDA being subject to shifts in US federal policy) and the need for substantial change to bring the UK system into alignment with that of the US within a short time frame.

Progress in negotiations but a wide gulf remains

The EU Council meeting on 23 March gave new momentum to the process by approving the draft Withdrawal Agreement and settling the negotiating framework for a future relationship. The draft Withdrawal Agreement sets out a programme for continuation of the UK-EU relationship until the end of 2020 and provides a degree of stability for industry. While the detail of the agreement remains somewhat unclear, and it is not yet binding, the indications are that it will permit the marketing of goods under the current system until the transition period expires. What happens after that is more uncertain.

The EU’s negotiating framework rules out the UK’s participation within EU structures on a sector-by-sector approach. This can be set against the UK Government’s preferred approach as outlined in Theresa May’s speech of 2 March of continuing participation in regulatory agencies like the EMA. The possible options for agreement include a Canada-style free trade agreement, relying on mutual recognition of each other’s standards where possible. But this approach is quite limited and certainly does not provide the same degree of market integration available to countries like Norway, that are willing to accept the rules made in the EU in full.

The UK is looking for something much closer than this in specified sectors – currently resisted by EU negotiators as cherry-picking.

As well as the approval and marketing of pharmaceuticals the report highlights the importance to the UK life sciences sector of continuing links in other areas. For example:

  • participation in EU-wide clinical trials – the report recommends adopting the Clinical Trials Regulation, likely to come into effect during the transition period in 2019.
  • participation in EU R&D programmes like Horizon 2020 and the Innovative Medicines Initiative, with an appropriate funding contribution.
  • mutual recognition of pharmacovigilance mechanisms and continued access to key decision making bodies like the Pharmacovigilance Risk Assessment Committee, or PRAC, and databases, like EUDAMED and EudraVigilance.

 Clear and explicit communication needed

The report calls on the UK Government to be much clearer and more explicit in communicating the impact of possible outcomes to the national healthcare system and to industry, not least so that industry has time to plan effectively.

As explained by RB Reckitt Benckiser,

“It is not possible to move to any new arrangements immediately post-29 March 2019. For example, if the UK was to withdraw from the EudraVigilance pharmacovigilance system, there is not time to build a UK-based system by March 2019, nor would a UK system provide the same level of public safety as it would cover a much smaller population.”

Government may seek to downplay the report as somewhat alarmist, but it does a thorough job of defining the issues and bringing together views from across the sector to push for the best possible outcomes for industry and patients alike.

Difficulties in asserting rights to data exclusivity

A court ruling on use of the European decentralised procedure for approval of a generic product shows the limited options available to an innovator company in protecting its data exclusivity rights.

What is data exclusivity?

Data exclusivity offers a limited period of protection for innovators in the pharmaceuticals field, by preventing reliance on their regulatory submissions by generic producers for an eight year period from the approval of the original product.  After that period, generic producers can begin their application for a marketing authorisation relying on the data submitted in support of the original application – the abridged procedure. If approved, marketing can begin two years later.

Astellas's product

In this case the innovator, Astellas Pharma GmbH, obtained a German national approval of its medicinal product Ribomustin in July 2005 for the treatment of non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma and multiple myeloma.  In 2010, Astellas obtained an approval in France of Levact, through the decentralised procedure. This product contained the same active ingredient and was approved for the same conditions plus chronic lymphocytic leukaemia.

The generic application

In 2012, Helm AG began an application for approval of generic product Alkybend, again through the decentralised procedure. Helm cited Levact as the reference medicinal product, but said that Ribomustin should be regarded as the reference medicinal product for the purposes of the data exclusivity period calculation. The Danish regulator was the reference member state for the purposes of the procedure, and in its assessment report, it accepted that Ribomustin should be taken as setting the date for the data exclusivity period. The Finnish regulator, FIMEA, then approved Helm’s application – a decision that Astellas challenged in the Finnish courts.

The court challenge

The Finnish courts recognised that Astellas faced a problem. An innovator company is not involved in the procedure for a generic approval application relating to one of its products. It has no formal role in the procedure and cannot readily make submissions to protect its data excluvity rights.

And the role of national regulators in other member states is also limited. The reference member state charged with making the assessment (here Denmark) must come to a decision. Once that decision is made by the reference member state it must be accepted by the other concerned regulators, unless they have an objection based on a serious risk to public health.

The Finnish courts asked the European court (the CJEU) for its opinion.

The CJEU confirmed that national regulators other than the reference member state have limited scope to separately assess the data exclusivity point. The decentralised procedure requires them to accept the assessment of the reference member state (here Denmark). They could raise objections based on data exclusivity at an earlier stage in the procedure, but not after the assessment report is finalised.  The CJEU also ruled that the Finnish court could not review the correctness of the decision on data exclusivity taken by the reference member state.

Three routes to approval in the EU system

This case highlights some of the difficulties inherent in the European system. Although extensively harmonised, there are still three routes to approval. The centralised route through the European Medicines Agency is the most harmonised. But the mutual recognition and decentralised routes rely on the involvement of national regulators and require cooperation and mutual reliance between them. These bring in the possibility of national discrepancies in interpretation and complexity as to how to challenge a decision. The Advocate General giving the analysis in this case explained that the decentralised procedure “remains somewhat distant from a unified procedural framework for the internal market in medicinal products”.

This complexity may be a factor for innovator companies to consider when deciding whether the centralised procedure is the best choice for them in a situation where it is optional.